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CHAPTER 8: TESTING THE RATIONALES FOR THE UK 1993 
PETROLEUM TAX RELAXATION 
8.1 Introduction 
The 1993 petroleum tax relaxation involved the following reforms as presented in 
chapter three of this thesis (section 3.4.4): 
a. PRT was abolished for oil fields with development consents on or after 16th 
March 1993. 
b. PRT allowances were also abandoned. These allowances were: oil 
allowance, exploration and appraisal expenditure allowance and the Cross 
Field Allowance. 
C. The rate of PRT was reduced from 75 to 50 per cent for paying oil fields that 
had obtained development consents before 16 th March 1993. 
It can be seen from the above reforms that the 1993 petroleum tax relaxation was 
different from the other two previous relaxations (1983 and 1987-88) in terms of 
defining areas which would benefit from this tax reform. This petroleum tax 
relaxation divided oil fields liable to PRT into two groups based on development 
consent date. These were: (a) oil fields developed after 16'hMarch 1993 which 
would not pay any PRT; and (b) oil fields developed before 1993 which would be 
liable to PRT at 50 per cent, but with no allowances. From these divisions it can 
be seen that, unlike previous relaxations, this tax reform targeted the whole area 
of the UKCS. This is because it did not specify a certain area to benefit from the 
reform, as was specified in the 1983 and the 1987-88 tax relaxations. 
Chapter four of this thesis identified the following rationales for the 1993 
petroleum tax relaxation: 
I. Encouraging more exploration and development activities of UK oil and gas 
resources by allowing companies to retain more of their profits. 
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2. Creating incentives for oil companies to invest in old fields. 
3- Abolishing PRT for new fields and reducing the rate to 50 per cent for old 
fields because PRT allowances cost the Government money in 1992, and 
removing them would enable the Goverm-nent to gain more revenue. 
4. Abolishing PRT for new fields and reducing the rate to 50 per cent for old 
fields to balance the effect of removing the Cross Field Allowance on the 
PRT paying fields. 
5 Flattening the UK petroleum fiscal regime in different areas. 
This chapter, similar to chapters six and seven, will empirically test the above 
rationales in the light of the above-mentioned tax reforms. The next section will 
discuss fields which benefited from this tax relaxation. 
8.2 Fields Which Benefited From The 1993 Petroleum Tax Relaxation 
Fields that benefited from this tax relaxation will be classified in two groups. The 
first includes any oil fields that obtained development consents between 16'h 
March 1993 and 2000. The second consists of oil fields which obtained 
development consents before 16 th March 1993. Every UKCS oil field, both 
onshore and offshore, was therefore affected by the 1993 PRT reform. Regarding 
the first category of oil fields, 64 offshore and eight onshore oil fields had 
obtained development consents during the period March 1993-2000. However, ten 
oil fields had revised development plans during this period, noticeably during 
1993 and 1994. Table 8-1 presents data regarding offshore oil fields that were 
developed between March 1993 and 2000. 
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Table 8-1: Offshore Oilfields that Obtained Development Consents Between 
1993 and 2000 
Offshore Oil Fields Development 1993-20W 


















Douglas WeB Nov-90 Oct-93 90 Schiefiallion WeB Oct-93 Apr-96 575 
Medwin CNS May-79 Nov-93 2 Curlew CNS May-90 Jun-96 132 
Lennox WeB Jul-( )2 Dec-93 60 Brimmond CNS Jun-85 Jun-96 3 
Fife CNS Apr-91 Mar-94 48 Dauntless CNS Nov-94 JLII-96 3 
Birch CNS, Oct-85 Mar-( )4 41 Gannet E CNS Jun-82 Ju)-96 I 1ý 
Machar 
I 
CNS Apr-76 Apr-94 162 Gannet F CNS Mar-, 69 Jul-96 20 
Blenheim CNS Nov-90 May-94 23 West Brae CNS Aug-75 Sep-96 39 
Carnoustie CNS Apr-80 Jun-94 I Kingfisher CNS Jun-72 Oct-96 114.5 
Pelican NNS Aug-75 Ali-94 103 Mallard CNS Sep-90 Oct-96 26.5 
Andrew CNS Jun-74 JUI-94 179 Iona CNS MaT-82 W-96 25.5 
Harding NNS Jan-88 Sep-94 220 Galley CNS Oct-74 Mar-97 35 
Foinaven WeB Oct-92 Nov-94 250 Bladon CNS Nov-96 ApT-97 3 
Captain CNS May-77 Jan-95 359 Ross CNS Dec-81 May-97 64 
Guillemot A CNS Dec-79 Feb-95 49 Merlin NNS Feb-97 Au-97 28 
Teal CNS Dec-89 Feb-95 40 Pierce CNS Mar-76 Aug-97 144 
Teal South CNS Oct-92 rTb-95 307 Janice CNS May-90 Sep-97 70 
Tbelrna CNS Jul-76 Apr-95 51 Larsh CNS Mar-86 Sep-97 10 
Stirling CNS Mar-80 Jun-95 3 Renee CNS Apr-76 Feb-98 16 
Nevis NNS Aug-74 Sep-95 116 Rubie CNS Mar-85 Feb-98 7 
Dunlin SW NNS Jul-73 Nov-95 400 Bittem CNS Jun-96 Mar-98 128.5 
MacCulloch CNS Mar-90 Nov-95 62 Guillemont W CNS Oct-79 Mar-98 
65 
Banff CNS Oct-91 Nov-95 84.5 
Guillemc)nt 
NW 
CNS Jul-85 Mar-98 
Telford CNS Oct-92 Dec-95 64 Flora CNS Jul-79 ý-Pr-98 17 
Monan CNS, Dec-90 DeC-95 25 Buckland NNS Mar-79 J\pr-98 44 
Heron CNS Nov-88 DX-95 105.5 Kyle CNS Aug-93 Oct-98 38 
Egret CNS Aug-91 Dec-95 18 Gannet G CNS Apr-98 Nov-98 13 
Mungo CNS May-89 Dee-95 203 C)rion CNS Sep-71 Jan-99 21 
Arkwright CNS Apr-90 D(XI-95 25 Cook CNS Nov-83 May-99 23 
Skua CNS Jun-89 lXc-95 28 Keith NNS Aug-83 Dec-99 40.5 
Magnus S NNS 
I 
JUn-74 Feb-96 23.5 Blake CNS Mar-97 Jan4)0 56 
Fergus 
I 
CNS Oct 94 Mar-96 7 Beauly CNS Jun-98 Aug-00 3 
Durward CNS Oct 93 
F., 
6qir-96 II Leadon NNS Jun-79 Dec-00 14-57 
Sources: location from GEM (2004, v. 3.01); discovery date from the DTI (2000a). 
Notes: Annex B approval dates from the DTI (2004d) and reserves volume from the OPL 
(2004). Location abbreviations used in the above table: CNN for central North Sea; NNS 
for northern North Sea; and WeB for west of Britain. Mboe stands for million barrels 
of oil equivalent. 
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From the above table, it can be seen that 21 offshore oil fields were discovered in 
the 1960s and 1970s, but these fields obtained development consents after 1993. 
In terms of size of the oil fields, 64 offshore, one has a large reserve, six have 
medium reserves,. 20 have small reserves and 37 have very small reserves. 
Further, four fields are located in the west of Britain, nine in the northern North 
Sea and 51 in the central North Sea. These statistics show that the majority of the 
offshore oil fields that gained development consent after 1993 were of a very 
small size and located in the central North Sea. Notwithstanding, these statistics 
also show that a considerable number of the fields that obtained development 
consents during the period 1993-2000 were discovered during the 1960s and 
1970s. This means that these fields were not considered commercial under the 
pre-1993 petroleum fiscal regimes, and this reform might have made them again 
commercial propositions. 
The main focus of this research is on UK offshore activities. Therefore the 
analysis in this chapter will ignore both onshore fields and revised onshore fields. 
This will not affect the results materially for a number of reasons. This is because 
the number of onshore fields is small compared with the number of offshore fields 
that were granted development consents between 1993 and 2000, and because this 
research focuses mainly on offshore fields. 
8.3 Testing the Rationales For the 1993 Petroleum Tax Relaxation 
Investigating the theoretical effects of the 1993 petroleum tax relaxation on 
offshore oil fields indicates significant effects. Obviously oil fields liable to PRT 
at the time of the relaxation should have benefited from the reduction in the rate 
of PRT from 75 to 50 per cent. At the same time these fields lost the allowances 
that used to be offset against the PRT profit, such as allowance for exploration 
and appraisal expenditures. As was disclosed above, most of the fields benefiting 
from this tax relaxation were of a very small and small reserves' volume. 
However, a number of these fields would not any way have been liable to PRT 
because of the size of their reserves, the oil allowance, and the safeguard concept. 
As a negative aspect of this relaxation, companies which operated benefiting 
fields had lost the ten per cent Cross Field Allowance, which was also abolished 
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in 1993. This ten per cent Cross Field Allowance acted as allowable cost against 
PRT for paying (receiving) fields. Table 8-2 presents three PRT scenarios with 
regard to the PRT liability of a number of the offshore oil fields that obtained 
development consent between March 1993 and 2000. 
Table 8-2: Scenarios of PRT Liability of a Number 
of Post-1993 Oil Fields 
Oil Fi ld 
Total PRT Liability EM 
e Post- 1993 Post-1983 Pre-1983 
Douglas 0 38.5 102.4 
Medwin 0 0 0 
Lennox 0 5.7 47.3 
Fife 0 0.7 14.1 
Birch 0 0 0 
Machar 0 49.5 255.6 
Blenheim 0 0 0.4 
Pelican 0 0 0 
Andrew 0 405.4 590.2 
Harding 0 770.4 916.3 
Foinaven 0 454.6 441.6 
Captian 0 0 0 
Guillemot A 0 0 0 
Teal 0 0 20.7 
Teal South 0 0 0 
n, k Note: Figures in the bove table were obtained by applying different fiscal scenarios to 
the fields in the table. This application was by using the GEM (2004, v. 3.01). The 
scenarios are: the pre- and the post-1983, and post-1993 petroleum fiscal regimes. 
The above table shows that there were cases where oil fields which would not 
have been liable to PRT according to the pre-1993 and pre-1983 petroleum fiscal 
regimes. This means that these fields did not benefit from the 1993 petroleum tax 
relaxation, which abolished the PRT. Their operating companies lost the Cross 
Field Allowance which helped them previously in reducing their PRT liabilities in 
other fields. 
The next sections present the tests and analyses of individual rationales for the 
1993 petroleum tax relaxation. 
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8.3.1 Encouraging More Exploration and Development of the UK Oil and 
Gas Resources by Allowing Companies to Keep More of Their Profits 
This rationale is common to the three petroleum tax relaxations as was shown in 
chapters six and seven of this thesis, (see sections 6.4.1 and 7.3.2). In order to test 
this rationale, the growth of oil and gas activities will be measured. This growth 
can be measured, as was stated in chapter five of this thesis (section 5.4), by 
measuring the increases in expenditure on these activities, and the increases in the 
number of drilling wells relating to each activity. After that, the cash flow of oil 
companies will be checked to see if the 1993 tax relaxation resulted in these 
companies keeping more of their profits. Moreover, the possibility of using these 
profits in further activities within the UKCS will be discussed and illustrated. 
The next section discusses exploration and development activities post-1993 in 
some detail, and examines the possible effects of changes in oil prices on 
exploration activity. 
Exploration and Development Activities 
Table 8-3 presents figures relating to UKCS exploration, appraisal, development 
and production activities during the period 1990-2000. 
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1990 13.2 1,182 237 2,425 124 6 2,311 91,588 
1991 11.4 1,637 197 3,343 144 7 2,643 91,260 
1992. 11.0 1,955 145 3,774 167 4 2,603 94,251 
1993 11.3 1,508 121 3,231 162 3 2,885 100,085 
1994 10.4 1,213 115 2,560 202 9 3,036 126,706 
1995 
. 
10.9 939 1,19 2,876 244 17 3,054 129,894 
1996 13.3 1,097 147 2,997 261 13 3,100 129,742 
1997 11.8 1,194 136 2,934 257 7 3,122 128,234 
1998 
. 
7.9 762 1.15 3,188 281 9 3,072 132,633 
1999 11.2 457 55 2,000 225 3 2,955 137)125 
2000 19.1 377 73 1,758 216 3 3,117 126,246 
Source: DTI (1990-2000), The Brown Book, Appendices 2,5 and 6. 
It can be seen from the above table that the level of exploration and development 
expenditure and the number of drilling activities varied during the period 1990- 
2000. Exploration and development expenditures fluctuated throughout the above 
period. These expenditures decreased after 1992 over the years 1993,1994 and 
1995. Then after 1995, they increased up to the year 2000, but stayed below the 
1992 level. Similarly, the number of exploration and appraisal wells decreased 
after 1992, and increased slightly in 1996, but after that followed a downward 
trend. Noticeably, the number of development drilling wells increased after 1993 
peaking at 281 wells in 1998 and after that decreased in 1999 and 2000. It can be 
seen from Table 8-3 that the number of development consents that were granted 
every year was in line with the number of development drilling wells during the 
penod 1993-2000. It also can be seen, from the above table and discussion, that 
after 1993 there was a growth in development activity, but not in exploration 
activity. The 1993 petroleum tax changes, by abolishing exploration expenditure 
allowance, reduced exploration incentives. This is likely to have affected 
exploration activities. This inference is supported by the above figures and 
discussion. At the same time the tax changes have encouraged more development 
as they reduced the tax burden on oil production. This is reflected in the 
noticeable increase in oil production after 1992. 
285 
However, it was discussed in chapter five, section 5.6, that exploration activity is 
sensitive to changes in oil prices. As can be seen from Table 8-3 oil price 
decreased significantly after 1993. This decline might have caused a reduction in 
exploration activities within the UKCS. In searching for a possible link between 
changes in oil prices and exploration activities, a correlation coefficient was 
plotted, using data from Table 8-3, in the first instance between exploration 
expenditure and oil prices and in the second between the number of exploratory 
wells and oil prices. The correlation coefficient was plotted for the period 1993- 
2000, this to observe the association of these variables. The results of this 
statistical measure show that the relationship between exploration activity and 
changes in oil prices during the period 1993-2000 were not in the normal range. 
This is because the correlation coefficient between exploration expenditure and oil 
prices is equal to -0.598, and to -0.281 for the correlation between the number of 
exploratory wells and oil prices. This indicates that exploration activities during 
the period 1993-2000 were not associated with changes in oil prices, but 
influenced by something else - most likely the 1993 petroleum tax changes. 
Profits and Cash Flow of UK Oil and Gas Companies 
As was addressed in chapter four (section 4.3.3 )a number of companies stated 
that they benefited from the 1993 petroleum tax relaxation. One of these 
statements is BP's (1993, p. 29) declaration: 
"From I July 1993, the Finance Act reduced the rate of Petroleum Revenue 
Tax (PRT) from 75% to 50%, eliminated relief for exploration expenditure, 
and removed the PRT liability for new fields. The benefit to 1993 after-tax 
income of the reduced rate on current production was about E60 million". 
This section will empirically check the cash flow of the Government and the oil 
and gas industry. It will examine first the Goverm-nent take to show changes, if 
any, to this take after 1993. Then it will present the cash flow of oil fields and oil 
and gas companies, to illustrate changes to these cash flows. Table 8-4 presents 
annual total PRT payments along with total oil production and total Government 
tax revenues from the oil industry over the period 1990-2000. 
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Table 8-4: PRT and Govemment Tax Take 1990-2000 
Financial Year PRT EM Total Revenues 
EM 
Total Offshore Oil 
Production (M 
tonnes) 
1989/1990 1,050 2,401 86.234 
1990/1991 860 2,343 83.129 
1991/1992 -216 1,016 85.222 
1992/1993 69 1,339 90.213 
1993/1994 359 1,266 114.383 
1994/1995 712 1,683 116.743 
1995/1996 968 2,338 116.679 
1996/1997 1,729 3,351 115.340 
1997/1998 963 3,331 119.061 
1998/1999 504 2,514 123.977 
1999/2000 847 2,594 114.635 
Source: DTI (1989-2000), The Brown Book, Appendices 8 
and 9. 
The above table shows that PRT payments were declining till 1992, when the PRT 
cost the Government E216 million. The DTI (2000a, p. 124, footnote) states: 
"The net PRT repayment in 1991/92 and low net receipts in 1992/93 resulted from 
high tax-relievable expenditure claimed on some fields". However, the 1993 
petroleum tax reforms should have increased the PRT receipts in subsequent 
years, and therefore the total Govemment tax take. This supports what Mr. Geoff 
Barnard stated in the interview with the author when he mentioned that the Cross 
Field Allowance cost the Government money in 1992, and this led to abolishing 
this allowance in the 1993 Budget, Government revenues increased after 1992. 
This theoretically means that the oil industry take should have decreased. It was 
mentioned above that some companies had benefited from the 1993 petroleum tax 
changes, and saved money from the reduction in the PRT rate. Oil companies' 
cash flow does not give a clear picture of an increase in receipts as a consequence 
of the reduction, if any, in PRT payments, as cash flow might increase because of 
a reduction in other costs or an increase in receipts. However, as can be seen from 
Table 8-4 above, oil production increased after 1992 up to 116.7 million tonnes in 
1995. This increase in crude oil production should have increased the total 
payment of PRT to the Government, and at the same time benefited the oil and 
99 Mr Geoff Barnard is a civil servant from the Oil Taxation Office (OTO) of the Inland Revenue. 
He was interviewed by the author in London on 20/01/2004. 
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gas industry's cash flow. Nevertheless, checking the Government take (cash flow) 
from oil companies should give a better idea regarding any changes in these 
companies' cash flows resulting from the reduction in PRT after 1993, bearing in 
mind that the Government take depends not only on PRT rate but also on the level 
of production and oil prices. The best measurement is therefore the one that links 
PRT payments to production. Calculating PRT payments for one tonne of oil for a 
number of companies over the period 1990-2000 will provide such a measure. 
These calculations should show any increase/reduction in PRT payments for a 
tonne of oil, and hence will indicate any decrease/increase in the oil industry's 
cash flow as a consequence of the 1993 petroleum tax reform. 
Table 8-5 presents PRT payments for a tonne of oil equivalent for a number of oil 
and gas companies operating within the UKCS during the period 1990-2000.100 
The companies were selected based on the criterion that these companies should 
have had PRT liabilities before 1993. It is clear from Table 8-5 that the 
companies' liability to PRT per tonne of oil equivalent (toe) was reduced after 
1993. For example, Exxon Mobil's PRT liability was reduced from E17.2/toe in 
1993 to E4.6/toe in 1994, and was in the same range over subsequent years. 101 
However, it is noticeable that the PRT liability increased for every company in 
1996-1997, and more specifically in 1997. This increase in the PRT during these 
two years might be because of the substantial increase in oil price from E16 in 
1995 to E20 in 1996 and E18 in 1997, or the increase in oil production over these 
two years. Total offshore oil production decreased from 116.7 million tonnes of 
oil (mmto) in 1996 to 116.6 minto in 1997 and to 115.3 minto in 1997. 
100 For detailed calculation please refer to Appendix 5.1. 
101 toe stands for tonne of oil equivalent, and mmto stands for million tonne of oil. 
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Table 8-5: PRT/toe For Companies Operating in the UKCS During the Period 1990-2000 
Year PRT Payments f/Tonne 
BP ChevronTexaco Shell ExxonMobil Premier Viking 
1990 33.6 38.3 37.1 37.4 0.9 3.7 
1991 36.5 39 15.1 15.2 -0.8 18.2 
1992 27.1 30.4 15.1 15.4 0 1.3 
1993 25.3 32.3 17 17.2 0 -3.6 
1994 17.5 16.5 4.5 4.6 0 24.7 
1995 17.8 20.7 5.3 5.4 21.8 4.2 
1996 24.0 20.1 9.1 9.1 19.3 3.2 
1997 20.8 21.8 13.4 13.5 20.4 2.3 
1998 10.9 103 5.6 5.9 13.8 -2.6 
1999 6.3 2.9 2.6 2.9 14.2 -3.7 
2000 15.4 8.5 10.9 11.4 27.8 0 
Source: calculations based on data extracted from GEM (2004, v, 3.01) 
Note: toe stands for tonne of oil equivalent. 
However, it should also be noted that different companies may be affected 
differently, as companies which were liable to PRT before 1993, should have 
benefited from the reduction in PRT rate from 75 to 50 per cent. Conversely, 
companies that were not liable to the PRT before 1993, and would not have been 
liable after that date, would not have benefited from these tax changes. 
Conclusion 
In the light of the above analysis and discussion, it can be concluded that the 1993 
petroleum tax relaxation was a success in stimulating development activity, but 
not exploration activity. It helped also oil and gas companies to make extra profit 
resulting from the saving in PRT payments as a consequence of reducing the PRT 
rate to 50 per cent. However, the 1993 petroleum tax relaxation did not offer any 
incentive to companies with only small and very small oil fields, because these 
companies might not previously have been liable to PRT. Companies with large 
oil fields liable to PRT benefited from the reduction in the PRT rate from 75 to 50 
per cent, but they no longer benefited from any offsets against PRT liabilities. The 
link between the two parts of this rationale (i. e., allowing oil companies to keep 
more of their profits to use them in further exploration and development wit in 
the UKCS) is not valid. It was discussed before in chapter six of this thesis 
(section 6.4.3). This point was argued in that section that it is not necessary for 
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any oil corporation to use any extra finance arising from any particular province 
in further investment in that province. For example, an oil and gas company might 
generate extra cash flow from its operations in the North Sea and use this extra 
money in investment in the Gulf of Mexico, rather than in the North Sea. 
The 1993 petroleum tax changes are most likely to have stimulated production 
activities rather than exploration and development. First of all, they abolished the 
exploration expenditure relief, and so exploration activity was expected to slow 
down. In addition, as was shown in Table 8-1 and Table 8-2 above, most new 
discoveries were of very small and small oil reserves, and a number of these fields 
would not have been liable to PRT according to the pre-1993 tax regime. 
Therefore, abolishing PRT for these fields brought nothing to them in reality. 
Reducing PRT for old fields to 50 per cent should have provided incentive to 
increase production, and meant that oil companies would have been encouraged to 
produce more to benefit from this reduction. However, it cannot be stated here 
that any increase in oil production from the UKCS after 1992 was merely because 
of the 1993 petroleum tax reforms, as oil prices and the oil market play essential 
role in deciding the production volume. It was stated earlier in this chapter that oil 
prices had not had a significant effect on exploration activity during the period 
1993-2000, and this might be because of the adverse effects of the fiscal changes 
on this activity. However, the abolition of, and the reduction in, PRT rate and any 
increase in oil prices should have acted as a production incentive. 
From the above analysis it can be stated that the rationale was only partly met by 
the policy, because it was not successful in persuading oil companies to increase 
their investment in exploration activity. However, the analysis shows that the 
policy was successful in stimulating oil companies to increase their investment in 
the development phase and consequently increase their production - although, as 
we shall see, this was at the expense of a substantial loss in Government revenue. 
8.3.2 Creating Incentives for Oil Companies to Invest in Old Fields 
This rationale targets old fields, as re-investing in old fields means that more 
development operations and facilities will be added to an existing field at a certain 
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time in its productive life, to enable further extraction of the recoverable reserves. 
This re-investment requires DTI approval. In this regard, operators should prepare 
a revised Field Development Program (FDP). The purposes of such a programme 
are: (1) to advise the DTI of divergence from any former approved field 
development programme; and, (2) to demonstrate that the field is managed in a 
manner that will maximise economic recovery of the hydrocarbons. This 
programme should be used to identify departures from the expected performance 
and planned development. The FDP should contain a number of items, one of 
which is a field description. This description should detail recoverable reserves, 
well status and operations, facilities and infrastructure of the field. The DTI deals 
with these programmes and approves them if they provide evidence of 
commerciality and recoverable commodities (DTI, 2005). The expected benefits 
of re-investment in old fields may be one or more of the following: (a) 
maintaining cash flow and employment; (b) using the existing infrastructure for 
more production; and (c) obtaining more petroleum from existing fields. The main 
idea behind this policy initiative is to promote the idea that those fields may still 
yield valuable output even after they are thought to be exhausted. "Think renewal 
rather than end-game" was the slogan of the DTI (DTI, 2000c) 
As was mentioned above in this chapter (section 8.2), ten development revisions 
were made during the period 1993-2000, namely, one onshoreand nine offshore 
oilfields. Table 8-6 presents data relating to type, discovery dates, development 
dates and revised development dates for these ten oil fields. 
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Table 8-6: Revised Development Cosents for Oil Fields During 1993-2000 
Oil field Type Discovery Development Revision 
Wytch Farm Onshore 1973 76 1993 
Br nt Off h 1971 1975 
Mar-93 
e s ore 
Apr-93 
Tern Offshore 1975 1985 1993 
Scott Offshore 1984 1990 1994 
Claymore Offshore 1974 1985 1994 
Scapa Offshore 1975 1985 1994 
Brae South Offshore 1972 1980 1994 
Osprey SW Offshore 1974 1988 1994 
Magnus Offshore 1974 1978 1994 
Source: oil fields' names, types and revision dates were obtained from 
the DTI (2004d), and discovery dates and development dates were 
obtained from the DTI (2000a) and OPL (2004). 
It can be seen from the above table that the revised FDPs for the above fields took 
place in the two years 1993-1994. It was mentioned in testing rationale one above 
that oil companies were encouraged to increase oil production because of a 
reduced tax rate (50 per cent PRT). This was a real incentive to oil companies to 
revise the state of existing fields in order to increase production. However, 
because of the scarcity of detailed information available about decision drivers for 
oil fields' developments and re-developments, it cannot be stated that the re- 
developments of the above fields were solely a consequence of the 1993 
petroleum tax relaxation. For example, the re-development of the Brent oil field in 
1993 was not because of the 1993 petroleum tax changes, as this decision was 
made in 1992 by Shell Oil (OPL, 1998, p. 308; Kuyper, 2002). There is scarcity of 
infort-nation about the conditions for the re-investment in old fields. Even trying to 
check whether these fields have achieved the expected benefits from their revised 
development plans is not possible by reference to any data available in the public 
domain. It can be seen from Table 8-7 that capital expenditure was increased 
materially in 1993 and 1994 for these fields. This increase represents the required 
re-development costs. In terms of production, it cannot be established how much 
production increased as a consequence of the revised development. For example, 
Table 8-7 shows capital expenditure and production history for a number of the 
revision in these oil fields. 
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1990 155 0.0 50.5 2,000 15.8 1,250 16.2 6,700 
1991 731.6 0.0 155.4 2,525 14.8 1,300 0.0 6,775 
1992 630.7 0.0 70.5 2,300 0.0 1,400 14.5 7,550 
1993 361.1 1,630.00 110.9 2,350 34.7 1,375 7.1 7,750 
1994 115.3 81642.50 81.5 2,350 6.8 1,175 62.4 7,775 
1995 95.8 9,207.50 98.6 2,225 6.6 850 80.9 61175 
1996 126.5 7,350 38.4 2J50 9.6 950 51.2 5,150 
1997 42.2 6,200 24.8 2,075 9.4 925 25.5 3,475 
1998 37.3 5)132.75 36.1 1,775 0.0 785.25 32.1 3,550 
1999 35.4 4,347 31; a .1 1,665 0.0 1 654.5 40.0 
3,445 
2000 11.5 3ý 107 46.0 1,632.75 0.0 1 471 
, 
10.5 3,291 
Source: is based on figures extracted from the Annual Summary Cash Flow tables of the 
related fields in the GEM (2004. v. 3.01). Note: Capex stand for capital expenditure; t/y 
stands for tonne a year; OOOt/y stands for thousands tonne a year. 
From the above table, it can be seen that the capital expenditure for Scapa oil field 
was increased dramatically in 1993, while oil production was decreasing after 
1992. The re-development might have prevented the field from being abandoned, 
and helped extract more commodities from this field, but the data do not show 
when the field was expected to be closed down. The same applies to the other 
fields. Therefore, it can be said that the scarcity of data and information prevent 
this rationale being tested. However, in consultation with Mike Earp, a senior 
economist who is working for the DTI, 102 it was mentioned that a field 
development approval proceeds at the end of a long discussion with oil companies 
and a long time spent in preparation of plans. Mr Earp added: "I'd be surprised if 
any ofyour projects came forward quickly as a result of a tax change - but I have 
no detailed knowledge of any of them and I doubt if anyone in DTI (or the 
companies concerned) does now". 
Based on the above data and analysis, and by taking Mike Earp's comments into 
account, and assuming that the ten fields were re-developed based on plans prior 
to 1993, it will be suitable to conclude that this rationale was not met by the 
policy, since no more re-developments commenced between 1994-2000. 
On the 
102 The consultation was via email. For full information see Appendix 5-2. 
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other hand, it is still important to stress that the scarcity of information and data 
regarding the re-development drivers meant that it could not be established 
whether this rationale was met by the policy. 
8.3.3 Abolishing PRT for New Fields and Reducing the Rate to 50 Per Cent 
for Old Fields Came Because PRT Allowances Cost the Government 
Money in 1992, and Removing Them Would Enable the Government 
to Gain More Money 
The focus of this rationale is on the benefit to the Goverment. In particular it 
addresses the issue of the benefit to the Government from removing PRT 
allowances. These allowances were the Cross Field Allowance and the Cross 
Field Exploration and Appraisal (E&A) relief. Testing this rationale will be 
carried out by examining the total Government take from PRT before and after the 
reform was implemented. Investigating the effects of PRT allowances on total 
PRT payments should also help performing this test. This test will be performed 
by using the GEM (2004, v. 3.01). Detailed steps of using the GEM in performing 
the calculations are shown in Appendices 4.3 and 5-3. Offshore oil fields and 
operating companies that will be used in the analysis were obtained from the DTI 
(2004d). 
The Cross Field Allowance was the most important allowance which was 
abolished in 1993. This is because new oil fields tended to be small and protected 
by the safeguard from paying PRT, as was shown in rationale one of this chapter 
(section 8.3.1). This means that oil allowances were not important for these new 
fields. Removing the oil allowance from old fields also was not significant, since 
by 1993 these fields would have most probably benefited from the total 
accumulated quantities of oil allowances. It can therefore be said that the most 
important allowance to be removed was the Cross Field Allowance. It was shown 
in chapter seven (Table 7-7 on page 263) that the total theoretical financial benefit 
of the Cross Field Allowance to the oil fields which benefited from this allowance 
would have been f625.3 million over the period 1987-1992. This theoretically 
means that PRT payments were reduced by this sum over the period 1987-93. 
Abolishing this allowance should have benefited the Government take. The 
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question that might be raised is whether reducing the PRT rate in the 1993 Budget 
for paying fields to 50 per cent has compensated for the effect of removing the 
ýCross Field Allowance from the companies' and the Government's points of view. 
Table 8-4 above shows that in 1992 PRT cost the Government E216 million. 
Figure 8-1 shows how PRT payments increased after 1980 to peak at E7,177 
million in 1985, declined in 1986 to f 1,188 million, recovered to f 2,296 million 
in 1987 and declined after that to f-216 million in 1992. After 1992 the total PRT 
payments increased, to peak at fl, 729 million in 1997. 
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Source: is based on data extracted from the DTI (2000a), Appendix 5. 
It can be clearly seen from the above figure that after the Cross Field Allowance 
was implemented in 1987, PRT payments to the Government declined gradually 
to result in a negative cash flow in 1992. This analysis indicates a clear effect of 
the Cross Field Allowance on total PRT payments to the Government between 
1987 and 1992. The main focus of this analysis will be on the effect of the Cross 
Field Allowance, and the reduction of the PRT rate to 50 per cent on the 
Government tax take. The next paragraph explains the test which was used in 
performing this analysis. 
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The analysis was applied at a company level, and it used data for the period 1993- 
2000. The reason for choosing these dates was because 1993 was the date of the 
tax reform, and this study covers the period up to 2000. Two scenarios will be 
applied in this context. The first is based on the assumption that the Cross Field 
Allowance was not removed in 1993.103 The second is based on the assumption 
that PRT rate was not reduced to 50 per cent in the 1993 Budget. Based on the 
first assumption, the calculation was performed for fields developed between 
1993-2000. Fields were grouped according to their operating companies. In this 
regard, a 75 per cent (PRT) was calculated on ten per cent of development 
expenditure of these fields over the period 1994-2000. This represents the saving 
arising to oil companies on PRT payments as a consequence of benefiting from 
the Cross Field Allowance. Based on the second scenario, PRT was calculated on 
a 75 per cent and 50 per cent rate for companies that had developments during the 
period 1994-2000.104 Calculations will be performed for unmerged companies for 
simplicity. For each company, the total PRT payment over the period 1994-2000 
was compared at 50 per cent and 75 per cent PRT rate. The difference in the totals 
at these two rates represents the effect of reducing the PRT rate to 50 per cent on 
companies' cash flow, 105 and hence on Government tax take. Total Cross FiOd 
Allowance for fields relating to each company over the period 1994-2000 were 
compared with the PRT saving as a consequence of the PRT rate reduction for the 
same company over the same period. Here the possibilities are: 
I. Total Cross Field Allowance loss for a company would be less than the gain 
on PRT payments. In this case the company would have benefited from the 
1993 petroleum tax relaxation, by paying less PRT. 
2. Total Cross Field Allowance loss for a company would be more than the 
gain on PRT payments. Here, the company would have made a "loss" 
because of the 1993 petroleum tax relaxation, by paying more PRT, to the 
benefit of the Govenunent. 
103 This scenario was applied in testing rationale number 3 in chapter seven of this thesis. For 
detailed steps of using the GEM (2004) in performing this scenario, see Appendix 4-3. 
104 For more information regarding the application of this scenario please refer to Appendix 5-3 
"A". 
105Detailed calculations are shown in appendix 5-3 B for BP. 
296 
3 Total Cross Field Allowance loss for a company would equal the gain on 
PRT payments. Here the reduction in the PRT rate to 50 per cent would just 
offset the effect of removing the Cross Field Allowance. 
Calculations were made for four companies: BP, Amerada Hess, Total and Shell 
(Table 8-8). 
Table 8-8: Gain on PRT vs. Loss from 
Removal of the Cross Field Allowance 1994-2000 
Gain on PRT 
Cross Field 
Company Allowance Loss EM 
fm 
BP 1,986.50 315.3 
Amerada Hess 162.7 82.34 
Total 106.3 62.13 
Shell 545.2 257.5 
It can be seen that the total Cross Field Allowance loss would be less than the 
total PRT gain for every company. This means that reducing the PRT rate to 50 
per cent had benefited oil companies as they paid less PRT. In other words, the 
relaxation benefited the UK oil industry's cash flow, a finding which is consistent 
with the BP statement cited above on page 284. However, removing the Cross 
Field Allowance should have benefited the Government, because new fields 
tended to be of small sizes and not liable to PRT. This means that PRT payments 
were received from certain established fields, and the Cross Field Allowance was 
excluding a significant share of payments from these fields from being subject to 
PRT. The negative PRT in 1992 might have arisen as a consequence of declining 
oil prices during the early 1990s. Oil prices declined from $23.3 (E13.1) in 1990 
to $20.1 (Ell. 3) in 1991, to $19.3 (fIO. 9) in 1992, and to $17 (fll. 3) in 1993. 
These reductions in oil prices lowered oil companies' profits and hence, with the 
many allowances given, resulted in a negative PRT in 1992, In the succeeding 
years when oil prices increased, and with the slight increase in oil production, the 
total Government take from PRT payments increased. 
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Conclusion 
The above test shows that Government revenues from PRT were negative in 1992, 
i. e., the Government paid cash to oil companies. The Cross Field Allowance 
caused a considerable share of PRT revenues to be lost by the Government. 
Obviously removing such an allowance should have enabled the Government to 
keep more of its tax revenues. Abolishing PRT for new fields would, 
theoretically, have encouraged oil companies to increase their investment. 
However, given that new fields tended not to be liable to PRT, abolishing this tax 
for new fields was irrelevant. On the contrary, reducing the rate to 50 per cent for 
old paying fields was very relevant. The analysis shows that oil companies gained 
more revenues by reducing PRT rate to 50 per cent than they would have 
benefited from keeping the Cross Field Allowance in force. It can therefore be 
concluded that removing PRT allowances would have benefited the Government, 
but reducing the PRT rate to 50 per cent benefited oil companies. It might have 
been thought at the time that the Cross Field Allowance would have cost the 
Government more money in future, by offsetting ten per cent of development 
expenditure of new fields against PRT liabilities in other fields. Removing this 
allowance, along with reducing the PRT rate for paying fields, would benefit the 
Government in the long term. However, as was shown in the analysis, the removal 
of the Cross Field Allowance did not offset the effect of reducing the PRT rate to 
50 per cent up to the year 2000 from the Government perspective. Furthermore, 
the number of new developments between 2000 and June 2005 was only 22 
according to the DTI (2004d). This means that the Government might have been 
better off by not to remove the Cross Field Allowance or not reduce the PRT rate 
to 50 per cent. Based on this analysis, it can be stated that this rationale was not 
met by the policy. 
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8.3.4 Abolishing the PRT for New Fields and Reducing the Rate to 50 Per 
Cent for Old Fields was to Balance the Effect of Removing the Cross 
Field Allowance on the PRT Paying Fields 
The previous rationale focused on benefit to the Government from the 1993 
petroleum tax relaxation, while this rationale focuses on benefits to the oil and gas 
industry from this relaxation. The test of the previous rationale showed that the 
reduction of the PRT rate to 50 per cent not only balanced the effects of 
abolishing the Cross Field Allowance, but also exceeded it. This is from the oil 
and gas industry perspective. However, the Government should have benefited 
from abolishing the Cross Field Allowance, which cost E216 million in 1992. The 
slight increase in production rate and the increase in oil prices after 1993 should 
have benefited both the Government and the oil industry. In this regard, for 
example, Amerada Hess would not have been liable to PRT in 1990 at oil 
production of 3,006.5 (000t/ Y) . 
106 However, when its production increased to 
65472.7 (OOOt/y) in 1996, the company became liable to this duty (GEM, 2004, v. 
3.01). A different situation applies to other oil companies. It is obvious from 
Table 8-9 below that oil and gas production had increased after 1993 for some 
other companies that operated in the UKCS at the time, while their PRT payments 
were decreased. This supports the previous argument that the 1993 relaxation was 
a production incentive, because oil companies could produce more at a reduced 
PRT liability, i. e., 50 per cent. Table 8-9 shows PRT payments along with oil 
production for a number of oil companies over the period 1990-2000. It can be 
seen from the table, and from Figure 8-2, Figure 8-3 and Figure 8-4, that different 
companies have different links between oil production and PRT payments. 
106 OOOt/y stands for thousand tonnes a year. 
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Table 8-9: Oil Production and PRT Pavinents Over the Period 1990-2000 
All Fields BP Amerada Hess 

















1990 94,649.72 3,461.99 19,659.57 857.47 3,006.48 - 
1991 93,967J0 2,829,09 18,183.67 887.17 3,186.99 - 
1992 98,312.03 2,346.24 19,416.62 684,61 4,575.20 - 
1993 103,347.03 2,814.86 20,046.50 691.94 4,365.52 - 
1994 126,923.14 1,439.03 23,414.65 539.18 6,472.73 2.97 
1995 133,110.40 1,634.78 21,980.35 527.46 7,228.03 62.88 
1996 133,237.11 2,310.72 22,566.91 783.18 7,112.03 54.49 
1997 131,525.89 2,570.09 21,118.32 643.46 7,017.66 51.00 
1998 135,644.29 1,401.40 25,020.80 368.00 6,061.33 33.96 
1999 139,288.92 911.58 29,698.08 260.01 6,130.49 14.68 
2000 127,093.18 2,346.31 27,155.26 639.16 6,208.25 34.60 
Source: figures in the above table were extracted from the related Annual Summary Cash 
Flow tables of the above companies in the GEM (2004). The following three figures are 
based on data in the above table. 
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Figure 8-4: Amerada Hess Oil Production and PRT Payments Over the Period 1990-2000 
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It can be seen from the above table and figures that while oil production increased 
after 1993 for all the fields in the UKCS, PRT liabilities decreased. The same can 
be said about BP. The relationship is different for Amerada Hess, which had 
increased PRT liabilities along with the increase in its oil production over the 
above period. Furthermore, extracting data from Shell Oil Company (1993-1997) 
shows that after 1993, oil production from UKCS increased for this company 
while PRT liabilities declined. The following table and figure present Shell oil 
production and PRT payments data. 
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1994 348 91 
1995 349 113 
199 61 353 227 
1997 
1 329 171 
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Note: OOOb/d stands for thousands barrels a day. 
The above argument shows that different oil companies have different experience 
with regard to changes in oil production and PRT payments. 
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In investigating a relationship between oil prices and PRT payments, a correlation 
coefficient was plotted for these two variables over the period 1993-2000. The 
result is 0.58; this shows that PRT payments are associated with changes in oil 
prices. This indicates that raises in oil prices could have a role, besides increases 
in oil production, in increasing PRT payments after 1993. However, the main 
intention of this rationale is checking whether the reduction of the PRT rate to 50 
per cent had offset the effect of removing the Cross Field Allowance. Table 8-8, 
from the previous rationale, shows that the reduction of the PRT rate more than 
offset the effects of abolishing the PRT allowances. Thus, it can be stated that the 
above rationale was met by the policy. 
8.3.5 The PRT Reform was an Attempt by the Government to Make the UK 
Petroleum Fiscal Regime Flat in Different Areas 
This rationale proposed that the 1993 petroleum tax relaxation was a means for 
removing tax differentials between different areas of the UKCS. However, t is tax 
relaxation had left the UKCS with three fiscal areas. These were: 
1. Offshore and onshore fields developed before 1982, which were liable to 
Royalty at 12.5 per cent, PRT at 50 per cent and CT at 33 per cent up to 
1997 and 31 per cent up to 2000. 
2. Offshore oil fields developed between 1982 and 1993, which were liable to 
PRT at 50 per cent and CT at 33 per cent up to 1997 and 31 per cent up to 
2000. 
3. Offshore and onshore fields developed after 1993, and which were liable to 
CT only at 33 per cent up to 1997 and 31 per cent up to 2000. 
From the above it can be seen that the 1993 tax relaxation divided the UKCS 
into 
three areas with three different tax marginal rates: the 
first one had a 70.68 per 
cent, the second had a 66.5 per cent, and the third had a 33 per cent only 
(31 per 
cent after 1997). This discussion points to the fact that the 
1993 petroleum tax 
relaxation, instead of removing tax differentials between 
different areas, added a 
new fiscal system to new fields which obtained development consents after 
1993. 
Each of these areas had different taxes and different liabilities from the others. 
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However, the 1993 petroleum tax relaxation made the fiscal regime flat for fields 
which obtained development consents after 1993. These fields did not have to pay 
PRT after 1993, and they were exempt from royalty payments after 1983 and 
1988. Therefore, it can be said that the above rationale was not met by the policy 
on the basis of the historical division of the UKCS fields into the pre-1993 fields 
groups and post- 1993 fields group. 
8.4 Summary 
The 1993 petroleum tax relaxation was not successful since it could not create real 
incentives for oil companies to invest in old field, and the loss resulted from 
abolishing the PRT for new fields and reducing the rate to 50 per cent for old 
fields was more than the loss resulted from the Cross Field Allowance. 
Furthermore, the relaxation did not make the petroleum fiscal regime roughly the 
same in different areas of the UKCS. However, oil and gas companies favoured 
the relaxation as abolishing PRT for new fields and reducing the rate for old fields 
compensated the loss of abolishing the Cross Field Allowance. Table 8-11 
presents a summary of the results which were obtained from testing the above 
rationales. The following paragraphs summarise the results which were obtained 
from testing the rationales for the 1993 tax relaxation. 
The 1993 petroleum tax relaxation discouraged exploration incentives and 
encouraged development and production activities. The tests showed that the UK 
oil industry benefited from the reduction of the PRT rate to 50 per cent. This was 
reflected in reduced payments of PRT per tonne of oil after 1993. Abolishing PRT 
for new fields did not have material effects on these fields, because most of the 
new fields tended to be of small and very small sizes. These fields would not have 
been liable to PRT according to the pre-1993 petroleum tax system, because the 
safeguard and the oil allowances would have protected them from being liable to 
this duty. At this point it can be said that while the Cross Field Allowance was a 
company incentive. 
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Table 8-11: Summary of the Results of Testing the Rationales for the 1993 Petroleum 
Tax Relaxation 
The Rationale 
Was Was not Was partly The 1993 Petroleum Tax Relaxations Rationales 
Met by the Policy 
Encouraging more exploration and development of 
UK oil and gas resources by allowing companies to NI 
keep more of their profits. 
Creating incentives for oil companies to invest in old 
fields. 
Abolishing PRT for new fields and reducing the rate 
to 50 per cent for old fields came because PRT 
allowances cost the Government money in 1992, and 
removing it would enable the Government to gain 
more money. 
Abolishing PRT for new fields and reducing the rate 
to 50 per cent for old fields was to balance the effect 
of removing the Cross Field Allowance on the PRT 
paying fields. 
An attempt by the Government to make the 
petroleum fiscal regime roughly the same in different 
areas. 
There is some indication of re-investment in old fields after the 1993 petroleum 
tax relaxation was implemented. The scarcity of data and information prevents a 
clear decision being reached as to whether the policy of creating incentives for oil 
companies to invest in old fields was achieved: in other words, whether re- 
investment in the ten mentioned old oil fields was a consequence of the 1993 
petroleum tax relaxation or other factors. Being that ten re-investments took place 
in 1993 and 1994, and Mike Earp's assertion (from the DTI) that re-development 
plans take a relatively long time to proceed, it is most likely that the 
decisions for 
re-development had been taken well before the tax relaxation was 
implemented. 
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The analysis showed that oil companies had benefited from the 1993 petroleum 
tax relaxation by gaining more on reduced PRT payments. The policy of 
removing PRT allowances and reducing the rate to 50 per cent was not successful. 
The Government would have been derived more revenue if the PRT rate had not 
been reduced to 50 per cent and the allowances had not been removed. However, 
the policy encouraged more production and, with the increase in oil prices, the 
PRT payments were increased. This means that both the Government and the oil 
industry had benefited from the 1993 petroleum tax relaxation. The analysis 
showed that the oil companies had benefited from reducing the PRT rate to 50 per 
cent more than it had lost from the Cross Field Allowance. This meant that the 
difference between the PRT gain and the Cross Field Allowance loss was a loss 
for the Government, and particularly that the increase in production and oil prices 
did not compensate for this loss. 
The 1993 petroleum tax relaxation divided the UKCS into three areas of different 
fiscal regime interests. Fields in each of these areas were subject to a different 
marginal tax rate from fields in other areas. Therefore, it can be said that the 1993 
petroleum tax relaxation did not make the whole LJK petroleum fiscal regime flat. 
However, the 1993 petroleum tax relaxation acted in a different way from the 
previous tax relaxations in that it was a direct production incentive. Oil companies 
had benefited from this tax relaxation, as they were encouraged to produce more 
to benefit from a reduced PRT rate. The 1983 and the 1987-88 petroleum tax 
relaxations were directed at exploration and development, while the 1993 
petroleum tax relaxation discouraged exploration by removing the exploration 
expenditure relief, and reduced development incentives by removing the Cross 
Field Allowance. However, as was mentioned in chapter five (section 5.4), 
investment in the oil and gas industry is a cycle and encouraging one stage may 
increase investment at other stages. Therefore, encouraging the production stage, 
by reducing the PRT rate, should have encouraged more exploration and 
development in the UKCS. There was not a noticeable increase in these activities 
after 1993. This might be because the risk arose from too many petroleum tax 
changes over the period 1981-1993. With such risk oil companies should have 
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focused on production activities rather than exploration and development in the 
UKCS. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION 
This chapter presents the conclusions of testing the rationales for the UK 
petroleum tax relaxations. Consequently, it reflects about the success and validity 
of the UK policy of tax relaxations in stimulating oil investment activities in the 
UKCS. This is to create a focused basis for discussing the significance of the 
findings from the thesis. One of the main objectives of this thesis was to identify 
the historical rationales for the three UK tax relaxations, and to test them from an 
ex-post position. This will help in reflecting upon the success of the UK tax 
relaxation policy. In other words, the thesis aimed at testing the assumptions, the 
validity, and the performance of the UK petroleum fiscal regime focusing on the 
interventionist approach of achieving aims via the use of the tax relaxation policy. 
The overall results of these tests and evaluation should also help in identifying the 
type of mineral resources governance that is in use in the UK. 
In order to clarify these objectives, this chapter will first outline the major results 
of testing the rationales that were presented in chapters six, seven and eight. 
Secondly, it will discuss the success of the UK petroleum tax relaxations policy. 
Thirdly, it will shed light on the issue of governance the mineral resources. 
Fourthly, it will highlight the significance of the results. 
9.1 The Outcome of the 1983 UK Petroleum Fiscal Regime Relaxation 
There have been several objectives of the 1983 petroleum tax relaxation. These 
aims are reflected in the rationales for this tax relaxation (see Table 4-1 on page 
127). However, the Govenunent policy focused chiefly on the following: 
1. Encouraging oil and gas activities, and focus mainly on accelerating 
development activity in the UKCS in general and in particular exploring and 
developing marginal fields. This would lead to more oil production and hence 
more taxes to be collected by the Government. 
2. Securing an adequate share of North Sea revenues to the nation. 
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3. Making the UK petroleum fiscal regime more sensitive to changes in the 
world oil prices by linking taxation directly to profit. 
Based on the above, it can be seen that the Government's policy of tax relaxation 
in 1983 aimed at increasing oil investments and hence increasing the total tax take 
from oil companies. However, the Government was not successful in achieving its 
aims: little came out of this relaxation and this little actually cost the Government 
significant amount of forfeited revenue. The tests showed that in the most cases 
the rationales were not met or met partly by the policy, see Table 9-1. This 
indicates that the 1983 petroleum tax relaxation as a full package was 
unsuccessful. The following paragraphs review the results of testing the rationales 
for the 1983 petroleum tax relaxation. 
The main target of the 1983 petroleum tax relaxation was to encourage more 
investment in the UKCS in terms of exploration, appraisal, development and 
production. The relaxation was not very successful in stimulating these activities 
and failed in particular in preventing the decline in development investment. It 
was concluded that this tax relaxation was a main driver for the development of 
two small oil fields; hmes and Duncan (see section 6.4.1 on page 189). The 
development of these two small oil fields is not sufficient to conclude that this 
relaxation was successful in increasing investment at the development stage. This 
is because Innes and Duncan were very small fields out of 14 oil fields developed 
during the period 1983-1987. The other twelve fields would have gone ahead 
anyway. The tests showed that exploration, appraisal, and development activities 
were directly linked and driven by changes in oil prices during the period 1980- 
1987. However, the relaxation managed to increase the total oil production as a 
consequence of the development of Innes and Duncan. This was a positive 
contribution towards sustaining production after 1988, but this was very minor 
contribution. This means that changes to the petroleum fiscal regime in 1983 did 
not have significant impact on oil investment activities during the period 1983- 
1987. In other words, the tax relaxation policy failed to stimulate further oil 
investment activities, and the Government failed to achieve its main objective of 
this tax relaxation.. 
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Table 9-1: Summary of the Results of Testing the Rationales for the 1983 
Petroleiim TnY'Ri-. Invnfln-n 
The Rationale 
The 1983 Petroleum Tax Relaxations Rationales 
Was Was not Was partly 
Met by the Policy 
Encouraging oil and gas activities, which 
include exploration, appraisal and 
development activities. 
Making sure that the regime secures an 
adequate share of North Sea revenues for the 
nation. 
Helping the oil and gas industry's cash flow 
to accelerate development activities. 
Encouraging the smaller and more costly 
fields (the marginal fields) in new areas to be 
explored and developed. 
The relaxation would encourage more 
exploration and development and this would 
help increasing the production level, which 
means more PRT and taxes to be paid by the 
industry to the Government. 
Making the whole tax regime more sensitive 
to changes in the world oil price by linking 
taxation exclusively to profit rather than to 
mixture of profits and revenues. 
Sustaining indigenous production beyond 
about 1988/90. 
Removing APRT would release some 
additional funds., which could be used for 
further investments. 
Correcting action by the Government to the 
1981 petroleum fiscal regime package, which 
introduced the SPD and gas levy. 
Keeping the whole Governmental revenues 
from existing fields and at the same time 
attracting the oil and gas industry to explore 
and develop new fields in new areas. 
Note: a 'tick' indicates whether the rational in questions was, was not, or was 
partly met by the policy. 
It was found that the Government had lost a portion of its take from new fields. 
This was because new fields were exempted from paying royalties, and had 
benefited from a double oil allowance compared with old fields. The loss was 
estimated to be of E13.5 million from the 14 oil fields that were developed 
between April 1982 and 1987. Extending the analysis to 1993 showed further loss 
to the Government which had lost a sum of E344.2 million ($582m) during the 
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period 1983-1993 because of this relaxation. The extra revenues from Innes and 
Duncan (f-54.5 million) during the period 1983-1993 did not compensate for the 
loss from the other twelve fields. This clarifies that the minor increase in oil 
production resulting from the 1983 tax relaxation was at the expense of the 
Government. Based on the above, it can be claimed that the UK Government was 
not successful in employing the tax relaxation policy in achieving its main target 
of increasing oil investment activities and consequently increase its tax take. 
The only positive sign of this relaxation is that although the 1983 petroleum tax 
relaxation reduced the marginal tax rate for new fields compared with old fields, it 
was still securing an adequate share from the oil resources to the nation 
(Petroconsultants, 1996). The average international petroleum tax take was set at 
75.3 per cent, while the marginal tax take from new fields in the UK was 79.3 per 
cent between 1982 and 1987 (see Table 6-9 on page 202). The relaxation aimed 
at, and was successful in keeping Government revenues from old fields which 
were not targeted, while trying to encourage more investment in new areas. This 
is not significant, since the 1983 tax relaxation did not target old fields. On the 
other hand, the cash flow of oil companies had benefited by f 195.5 million 
because of the petroleum tax reform. The increase in oil companies' revenues 
means a bigger share of the mineral resources was going to these companies, and 
hence a smaller share to the Govermnent. However, this is one sign of a non- 
proprietorial fiscal regime which is based on the idea of mineral resources being a 
free gift of the nature. 
The sharp decline in oil prices in the mid 1980s was a major restriction on the 
success of the 1983 petroleum tax relaxation. This was reflected in the 
Government losing a portion of its revenues from new fields because of the 
relaxation. These new fields would have been liable under the pre-1983 tax 
regime to royalty charges and would not have benefited from PRT allowances. 
However, abolishing royalties was more important to smaller fields than PRT 
allowances. This is because in most cases these fields would not have been liable 
to PRT because of the safeguard protection. The cash flow of these fields 
benefited by f 132.3 million from abolishing royalties; while the benefit was E66.6 
million from the PRT relief (see section 6.4.3). This is a logical result because 
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these fields were of small reserves and would not have been liable to PRT under 
the pre- 1983 tax regime. 
It was found that fields which had obtained development consents after 1982 
tended to be of smaller sizes compared with fields developed before that date. One 
of the major underpinnings of the rationales behind the relaxation was that it 
would cost more for the increasingly smaller discoveries on the UKCS to be 
developed. In fact such thinking had no empirical justification as the analysis 
showed that the costs of production of the new, smaller fields were lower not 
higher than those of their larger predecessors - something which should come as 
no surprise once it is born in mind that the newer, smaller discoveries do not 
require new infrastructure - they can latch onto and make use of the infrastructure 
built at great capital expense to access the earlier discoveries. For example, it was 
found that the average cost of a production unit (barrel of oil) from a small new 
field located in the central North Sea was $15.9, while it was about $30.7 from an 
old field from the same size and in the same geological location (see Table 6-13 
on page 212). Also the cost of a reserve unit was $12 in a new large field located 
in the northern North Sea, while the cost was $23 in an old field of the same 
reserve size within the same geological location (see section 6.4.4). These results 
are realistic because new fields had benefited in their development from the 
existence of infrastructure and improved technology. This means that these new 
fields had to bear less capital and other costs compared with old fields. In 
supporting this opinion, the author calculated the average operating and capital 
costs of the reserve and production units for both small and old new fields that are 
located in the central North Sea. It was found that these costs were almost double 
in old fields compared with the costs of new fields. The average unit operating 
cost was found to be $7.5 in the new fields and $14.5 in old fields. Also, while the 
average unit capital cost was $7.5 in new fields, it was $16.6 in old fields. 
The tax relaxation was beneficial for oil companies, as it increased the cash flow 
of these companies. One rationale suggested that this increase in cash flow would 
have been used in further investment activities within the UKCS. Actually the test 
illustrated that the removal of APRT and the lower tax burden on new fields after 
1983 had helped the increase in the oil companies' cash flow. However, 
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investment activities in a particular area will not necessarily increase just because 
of a possible increase in a company's cash flow that might arise from that 
Particular area (see sections 6.4.3 and 6.4.8). The extra cash flow might have been 
used in further investment in any other areas of interest to the operating company, 
or even in extra dividends to shareholders for example. However, the removal of 
APRT should have increased the oil companies' cash flow in the short term, as 
companies had to pay PRT on the due date. This short-term refreshment in the oil 
companies' cash flow is not sufficient for making long-term investment decisions 
such as exploration and/or development decisions. These decisions need a large 
continuous long-term source of finance, which means that the removal of APRT 
was unsuitable as a source of finance for stimulating this kind of investment. 
In terms of the sensitivity of the UK petroleum fiscal regime to changes in the 
world oil prices, it was found that the pre-1983 tax system was sensitive to 
changes in oil prices. This is because changes in oil prices would have brought 
changes in many different parameters. For example, assuming a three per cent 
increase in oil prices would have brought the following changes of the parameters 
of Clyde oil field: (1) an increase in the total field cash flow equal to 17 per cent, 
(2) an increase in the field post tax HZR equal to 0.86 percentage point, (3) an 
increase in the total Government tax take of 13 per cent, and (4) an increase in the 
average Government tax take per barrel of 11.1 per cent (see Table 6-15 on page 
224). The 1983 petroleum tax relaxation made the new regime more sensitive to 
changes in oil prices. This sensitivity was changed to the benefit of the oil and gas 
industry in the case of increasing oil prices, but to the benefit of the Government 
in the case of decreasing these prices (see section 6.4.6 and Table 6-16 on page 
225). However, according to the post-1983 petroleum fiscal regime, an increase in 
oil prices by three per cent would have changed the above mentioned parameters 
for Clyde oil field as follows: (1) an increase in the total field cash flow of 18 per 
cent, (2) an increase in the post tax IRR of the field by 0.90 percentage points, (3) 
an increase in the total Government tax take by 12 per cent, and (4) an increase in 
the average tax take per barrel by 10.8 per cent. It was claimed above that the 
sensitivity of the post-1983 petroleum fiscal regime to changes in oil prices was 
increased to the benefit of the oil and gas companies. This is because for example 
a change to the oil prices by three per cent would increase the total cash flow of 
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Clyde, for example, by 18 per cent, while the increase would have been by 17 per 
cent under the pre-1983 petroleum tax system. Furthermore, the average 
Government tax take per barrel of oil would increase by 10.8 per cent with a three 
per cent increase to oil prices under the post- 1983 tax scenario. The increase in the 
average Government tax take per barrel would be 11.1 per cent under the pre- 
1983 petroleum fiscal regime scenario. Similar results were obtained when 
different changes to oil prices were assumed, for example a four and ten per cents. 
Based on the above, it can be stated that the UK Government managed to increase 
the sensitivity of the fiscal regime, applied to new fields, to changes in the world 
oil prices. However, this change in sensitivity was to the benefit of the oil and gas 
companies, but not the Government. This is another sign of a non-proprietorial 
regime which sees that during difficult times for oil companies, the Government 
should interfere to compensate these companies for their loss by relaxing the 
fiscal regime or by providing some other investment incentives. 
Overall, it can be stated that the 1983 petroleum tax relaxation was not successful 
in stimulating more investment activities in the North Sea, and hence more oil 
production and higher Government tax take. On the contrary, the fiscal regime 
was relaxed for new fields; this had a negative impact on the Government take, 
but a positive effect on the oil companies' rent. The sharp decline in oil prices in 
the mid 1980s restricted the desired Government aims of the relaxation in terms of 
further investments, namely further oil production and further rent to both the oil 
and gas industry and the Government. These circumstances altogether led to the 
conclusion that the 1983 petroleum tax relaxation was not well planned and the 
consequence was that the Government aims behind the relaxation were not 
achieved. In other words, the Government was not successful in achieving its 
targets by using the policy of introducing a 'petroleum tax relaxation' in 1983. 
This was one of the reasons for the Government to present the second petroleum 
tax relaxation in 1987-88. 
313 
9.2 The Outcome of the 1987-88 UK Petroleum Fiscal Regime Relaxation 
By introducing the 1987-88 petroleum tax relaxation, the UK Government had the 
following main objectives. 
I. Accelerating oil and gas investments in new areas. 
2. Encouraging the development of the explored marginal oil fields in different 
areas of the UKCS. 
3. Extending the profit relatedness of the fiscal regime to the Southern Basin 
fields of the North Sea. 
It can be seen from the above aims that the Government focused on marginal oil 
fields in this tax relaxation. This was to increase oil supply, and hence to increase 
its petroleum tax take. 
The 1987-88 relaxation was successful in encouraging oil investment activities in 
the areas of new oil fields. Also the relaxation was successful in compensating for 
the dramatic fall in post-tax company cash flow, which resulted from the dramatic 
fall in oil prices in 1986, from the North Sea operations. However, the 1987-88 
tax relaxation was limited in encouraging developments of explored marginal oil 
fields, as out of 85 explored oil fields the relaxation was successful in turning only 
three of them into proved properties. On the other hand, this tax relaxation did not 
encourage any investment activities in the Southern Basin of the North Sea; 
because this basin was not targeted by this tax relaxation. Table 9-2 presents a 
summary of results obtained by testing the rationales for the 1987-88 petroleum 
tax relaxation. 
The following paragraphs review the results obtained by testing the rationales for 
the 1987-88 petroleum tax relaxation, 
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Table 9-2: Summary of the Results of Testing the Rationales for the 1987-88 
Petroleum Tax Relaxation 
The Rationale 
The 1987-88 Petroleum Tax Relaxations Was Was not Was partly 
Rationales 
Met by the Policy 
The unsuccessful 1983 petroleum tax 
relaxation was a reason for fonning the 1987- 
88 relaxation. 
To encourage further exploration and 
development expenditure on new fields. 
To develop explored marginal fields. Nf 
To reduce costs and encourage development 
activities in the marginal fields in the 
Southern Basin area of the North Sea. 
Abolishing royalties for the Southern Basin 
of the North Sea, to make the petroleum 
fiscal regime more profit-related. 
Introducing the Cross Field Allowance was 
to compensate for the dramatic fall in post- 
tax company cash flow from North Sea 
operations, and the implications of this for 
expenditure on new field projects. 
Note: a 'tick' indicates whether the rational in questions was, was not, or was 
partly met by the policy. 
The lack of success of the 1983 petroleum tax relaxation was one of the major 
reasons that led the Government to present the 1987-88-tax relaxation. Also, the 
sharp slump in oil Prices in the mid 1980s validated the Government intention of 
introducing such a relaxation. This decline in oil prices in the mid 1980s caused 
the cash flow of oil companies and oil fields to suffer a significant decline. The 
introduction of the Cross Field Allowance did increase the cash flow of these 
companies and fields, and was also a reason for boosting oil investment activities 
in the central and northern North Sea after 1987, The tests showed that the Cross 
Field Allowance had a positive impact on exploration and development activities 
in the areas of new fields. These effects are represented by the increased number 
of exploration and development drillings, and hence an increase in exploration 
and development expenditure after 1987. This means that introducing the Cross 
Field Allowance was a successful policy to enhance exploration and development 
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activities in the central and northern North Sea (see Table 7-2 on page 250). This 
is not surprising, because companies wanted to benefit from the Cross Field 
Allowance, and thus they accelerated their investments in these areas. In terms of 
encouraging the development of unproved marginal fields, the Cross Field 
Allowance stimulated the development of three discovered marginal oil fields; 
these were Strathspey, Miller and Scott (see section 7.3.3 on page 260). However, 
it was concluded that the policy of stimulating development of small marginal 
fields was not very successful, since out of 85 oil fields discovered before 1987, 
only three were developed as a consequence of the Cross Field Allowance 
measure. This means that the other fields, which were developed after 1987, had 
benefited from the Cross Field Allowance, but they would have been considered 
commercially viable without the allowance. This in its turn indicates a 
Government loss from these fields because of the allowance policy. 
It was suggested that the 1987-88 petroleum tax relaxation should have benefited 
new oil fields in the Southern Basin of the North Sea. However, this basin had not 
seen any oil developments after 1982, as it is mainly a gas basin. This means that 
the Southern Basin did not benefited from this tax relaxation, since the relaxation 
did not target gas fields. It was also suggested that eliminating royalties for new 
fields was to make the whole oil fiscal regime flat in the UKCS. This suggestion 
is flawed for the same previously stated reason. 
Based on the above, it can be concluded that the U-K Government did achieve its 
main targets for the 1987-88 petroleum tax relaxation. Oil and gas investment 
activities were enhanced by the influence of the Cross Field Allowance, and this 
allowance also encouraged the development of a number of previously explored 
oil fields, namely - Strathspey, Scott, and Miller. However, this tax relaxation 
was not effectively planned regarding the Southern Basin of the North Sea 
because this Basin did not witness oil developments after 1982. The success of 
this tax regime created a significant financial benefit for the oil industry, but not 
for the Government as the Cross Field Allowance cost the Government money in 
1992. This was the reason for abolishing this allowance in the 1993 tax reform. 
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9.3 The Outcome of the 1993 UK Petroleum Fiscal Regime Relaxation 
The main Governmental objectives of the 1993 petroleum tax relaxation can be 
summarised as follows: 
1. Encouraging oil and gas investment activities, with a particular focus on old 
fields. 
2. Removing the negative effects of the Cross Field Allowance on Government 
tax take. 
These objectives mirror the rationales for the 1993 petroleum tax relaxation from 
the Government point of view (see Table 4-3 on page 129). 
The 1993 petroleum tax relaxation was not successful in achieving the above 
aims, in particular the first one. Although oil companies found production 
incentives in this relaxation, exploration and development activities were not 
increased. This is because by abolishing the Cross Field Allowance the 
Government removed the development incentives. However, the removal of PRT 
for new fields and the reduction of its rate to 50 per cent for old fields were to the 
benefit of oil companies, but not the Government. The gain from the PRT reforins 
was higher than the loss resulting from removing the Cross Field Allowance for 
oil companies. Table 9-3 presents a summary of the results obtained by testing the 
rationales for the 1993 petroleum tax relaxation. 
The following paragraphs review the conclusions of testing these rationales and 
reflect on the success of the 1993 petroleum tax relaxation package, and hence on 
the validity of this tax relaxation. 
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Table 9-3: Summary of the Results of Testing the Rationales for the 1993 
Petroleum Tqx Relmintinn 
The Rationale 
The 1993 Petroleum Tax Relaxations Rationales 
Was Was not Was partly 
Met by the Policy 
Encouraging more exploration and development of 
UK oil and gas resources by allowing companies to 
keep more of their profits. 
Creating incentives for oil companies to invest in old 
fields. 
Abolishing PRT for new fields and reducing the rate 
to 50 per cent for old fields came because PRT 
allowances cost the Government money in 1992, and 
removing it would enable the Government to gain 
more money. 
Abolishing PRT for new fields and reducing the rate 
to 50 per cent for old fields was to balance the effect 
of removing the Cross Field Allowance on the PRT 
paying fields. 
An attempt by the Government to make the 
petroleum fiscal regime roughly the same in different 
areas. 
Note: a 'tick' indicates whether the rational in questions was, was not, or was 
partly met by the policy. 
The 1993 petroleum tax relaxation stimulated the production phase, but not 
exploration and development activities. This is because the 1993 petroleum tax 
refonn withdrew the exploration expenditure allowance, which had acted 
previously as an exploration incentive, and the Cross Field Allowance which had 
acted as development incentive. The reduction of the PRT rate from 75 to 50 per 
cent for old fields, and abolishing this duty for new fields, had benefited the cash 
flow of the oil companies (see Table 8-8 on page 297). For example, while PRT 
cost BP f27.1 per tonne of oil in 1992, the cost was f 17.5 in 1994. In general, this 
tax reform had benefited companies that were liable to PRT at that time. It was 
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also found that BP, for example, would have benefited by f 315.3 million from the 
Cross Field Allowance, while the PRT saving was f 1,986.5 million over the 
above period (see section 8.3.3). The difference between the gain from the PRT 
reforms and the financial loss of the Cross Field Allowance is a gain to the oil and 
gas companies' cash flow, and at the same time a loss to the Government tax take 
(see section 8.3.4). Therefore, the policy of removing the Cross Field Allowance, 
and reducing the PRT rate to 50 per cent was not successful in enabling the 
Government to increase its revenues after 1993. However, oil companies with 
only small and very small oil fields would not have been benefited, since these 
companies would not have been liable to PRT before the tax reform, and reducing 
the PRT rate to 50 per cent meant nothing to them in fact. 
The 1993 petroleum tax relaxation acted mainly as a production incentive, as oil 
companies were encouraged to produce more at a reduced tax rate from old fields, 
and paid only CT on profits, i. e., at a rate of 31 per cent, from new fields. This 
opinion is supported by the U-K oil production statistics which show that total oil 
production increased after 1993 (see Table 8-3 on page 285 and Table 8-4 on page 
287). The total Government tax take increased as well, but it was a very slight 
increase, Thus, it can be considered the production aspect of the Government 
policy that was incorporated in the 1993 petroleum tax relaxation was successful. 
Obviously this was at the expense of the Government tax take. 
It was also claimed that the 1993 petroleum tax reform would have made the UK 
petroleum fiscal regime flat in different areas of the UKCS. In other words, the 
1993 petroleum fiscal regime would remove the differences in tax liabilities of oil 
fields in different areas of the UKCS. This claim was not rational since this tax 
relaxation added a new fiscal regime with new terms that differed from other 
fiscal regimes in other areas of the UKCS. It also left the UKCS with three 
different fiscal regimes in the different areas. For example, fields in the new areas, 
which had benefited from this tax relaxation, had to pay only CT at 31 per cent. 
Fields that were developed before 1983 were liable to royalties at 12.5 per cent, 
PRT at 50 per cent, and CT at 31 per cent. Offshore oil fields that were developed 
between 1982 and 1993 were liable to PRT at 50 per cent and CT at 31 per cent. 
This left the UKCS with three different tax regimes and did not remove the 
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differences in tax payments between fields in different geological areas. This was 
a main reason for describing the UK petroleum fiscal regime as one of the 
weakest regimes in the world (Rutledge and Wright, 1998b, p. 811). 
It was suggested that the 1993 petroleum tax relaxation would create incentives 
for oil companies to re-invest in old oil fields. Here the analysis was restricted by 
a lack of information regarding these re-investment drivers. However the available 
data, beside the interview with Mr Mike Earp of the DTI indicates that this policy 
was not successful in stimulating more investments in old fields after 1993. The 
long time required for planning a re-development project and approving this plan 
by the DTI is evidence that the re-development of ten oil fields during the period 
1993-94 was not because of the 1993 petroleum tax relaxation. For example, it 
was stated in chapter eight of this thesis, section 8.3.2, that the decision to re- 
develop the Brent oil field was made in 1992, and the plan was approved in March 
1993. 
It can be concluded that the 1993 petroleum tax relaxation was successful in 
increasing the cash flow of the oil companies and in stimulating more production. 
However, this success was at the expense of the Government revenues. It was 
therefore the case that all three fiscal relaxations of 1983,1987-88, and 1993 
resulted in a sacrifice of actual Government's revenues. 
The evolution of the UK petroleum fiscal regime shows that the Government tried 
to secure more fiscal revenues from its oil resources up to 1982. After that it 
relaxed the petroleum fiscal regime three times to the year 2000. One of the main 
aims of the Government of introducing these relaxations was increasing oil 
investment activities. The 1983 and 1993 petroleum tax relaxations were not 
successful in achieving this aim. The Cross Field Allowance was an effective tool 
in encouraging development activities in the central and northern North Sea. 
However, none of these relaxations increased the Government tax take from the 
North Sea, but it was always the Goverm-nent who lost fiscal revenues as a result 
of these relaxations. This is an essential character of the non-proprietorial regime. 
It can be concluded that the 1987-88 petroleum tax relaxation was the most 
successful one among the three relaxations. 
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Introducing the three tax relaxations represent a significant change in the 
Government attitude towards its petroleum resources after 1982. This change in 
attitude indicates a change in the type of governance the petroleum resources. The 
next section illustrates this issue. 
9.4 The UK's Mineral Resources Governance: Proprietorial vs. Non- 
Proprietorial 
The discussion in section 2.2.1 established that the LJK ownership of petroleum 
resources differs from the non-nal ownership under standard concession 
agreements. This means that the concessionaire is given a right to produce from 
the concession area, but he does not have ownership over the minerals in ground. 
This indicates that the concessionaire is only granted mining and economic rights, 
but not mineral rights. This means that the UK has a unique model of concession 
which is often referred to as "the North Sea Model". This model accommodates 
private interests under public control, The public control, or 'ownership', allows 
the Government through its licensing system to lease out new areas and produce 
more oil from these areas, and also from old areas. 
Section 2.3.1 described different meanings of the economic rent concept, and 
section 2.4 illustrated two different types of governance of mineral resources: 
proprietorial and non-proPrietorial. Using the developmental conceptualisation 
which was discussed in section 2.4 to define the UK petroleum fiscal regime, in 
the light of the obtained outcome of testing the rationales for the three petroleum 
tax relaxations, gives significant results. Up to 1982 the UK Government seems to 
have adopted proprietorial regime for the governance of its mineral resources and 
behaved like a private landlord. Since the Government has tried before 1982 to 
capture more differential rent from different levels of oil production. For example, 
royalty payments and licence fees represented the customary ground rent, while 
SPD, PRT and CT payments represented the differential, or 'Ricardian', rent. The 
1983 petroleum tax relaxation abolished the main part of the customary ground 
rent, or 'royalties', for new fields. Part of the differential rent had already been 
abolished in 1982, i. e., SPD. These actions were aimed at stimulating exploration 
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and development activities in new areas, i. e., central and northern North Sea, and 
in particular marginal oil fields. 
The 1987-88 petroleum tax relaxation offered oil companies a significant portion 
of the Government's economic rent in forms of oil allowances in general, and in 
particular via the Cross Field Allowance. The new fields, according to the1987 
Financial Act, were targeted for differential rent merely, since they were only 
liable to PRT, besides ordinary CT. The 1993 petroleum tax relaxation left the UK 
Government with a very small proportion of economic rent from new oil fields, 
which was represented by the CT payments. This tax relaxation offered the UK 
petroleum resources from these fields to oil companies at a very low requirement 
for the surrender of economic rent in the context of the international benchmark 
for Government tax takes. It was discussed earlier in section 2.3 that oil 
companies have to pay special taxes because they deplete non-renewable oil 
resources, and they make super-profits compared to other businesses. 
Nevertheless, in the UK after 1993, the oil companies only had to pay standard 
corporation tax just like any other business despite depleting the UK non- 
renewable oil resources, and enjoying the super-profits. The tests of the rationales 
for the three tax relaxations showed that the Government had actually sacrificed, 
with each policy change, a significant part of its rent to the oil industry. 
The UK Government seems to have adopted the Ricardian rent theory to frame its 
licensing policy for oil resources, in that, as new fields after 1983 tended to be of 
small and very small reserves, the Government imposed a new policy based on 
fiscal relaxations. This policy induced changes in the UK contractual structure, 
and brought the Government rent down. This might be because 
it was thought at 
the time that new fields, because of their small reserves, would not be as 
profitable as large fields, but would be more costly in extraction terms. 
However, 
the analysis showed that the new policy increased the cash 
now of the oil 
companies, which gained benefit from extracting the UK oil resources 
from fields 
located in well-established areas. This demonstrates that the UK oil policy was 
not very well planned. The new fiscal regime followed the slogan 
"the land to the 
tiller" or "the minerals to the miner". Hence, it can be concluded here that the 
assumptions of this research, which were presented 
in section 5.3.1 on page 132, 
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are proved to be wrong. This is because the UK Government failed to increase its 
fiscal revenues by using the fiscal regime relaxation policy in encouraging oil 
investment activities. 
These features clarify the type of the UK governance of its oil resources as non- 
proprietorial for a number of reasons. These are: 
1) The UK Government depends on the DTI, as a licensing agency, in opening 
up new areas for investment when investors' proposals meet the DTI terms 
for work plans and experience. The overall goal was always to allow oil 
companies to deplete the available oil resources from the small and very 
small fields at the lowest possible cost to the companies. 
2) The Government played an administrative role over petroleum resources, 
believing that natural resources are a free gift of nature to producers and, 
eventually, to consumers. However, even this belief is wrong as in the case 
of the UK oil resources, oil was not free gift for consumers who have to pay 
a high final price when compared with the exploitation cost - producers 
alone enjoyed the super profits. 
3) In term of taxation, the customary ground rent, royalties, were abolished. 
The UK petroleum fiscal regime post-1993 primarily targetted excess profit, 
whilst oil companies were enjoying the super-profits from the new fields. 
The above illustrates how the ownership of mineral resources is not very 
important compared with the type of governance exercised over these resources. 
It was also illustrated earlier in this thesis (section 2.4 on page 41) that when 
countries and individuals gain more experience and self-confidence to 
develop 
their mineral resources, they move to the proprietorial 
form of control, which 
focuses on granting the mineral's owner a greater share of the minerals e. g., as 
in 
the case of Indonesia. It was also mentioned in section 
3.5, on page 94, that after 
1975, but prior 1982, LTK oil policies were directed at ensuring 
high tax take for 
the state, more regulated development investment, exercising more control over 
oil supply, and encouraging the offshore supplies 
industry in the UK. Hence, the 
policy was changed for the period 1982-2000 
for the satisfaction of the oil 
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companies by relaxing the petroleum fiscal regime three times. This means that 
the UK behaviour was against the norm regarding the change in governance 
mineral resources from non-proprietorial to proprietorial regime, since the UK 
petroleum fiscal regime seemed to be proprietorial between 1975 and 1983, and 
then changed to non-proprietorial after 1983. 
9.5 The Significance of the Results 
This section will discuss the significance of the findings of this research based on 
two perspectives, these are the literature and the policy. 
9.5.1 Significance of the Findings With Respect to the Literature 
The results of this research are significance and unique when compared with other 
similar studies, particularly Martin (1997). This uniqueness arises from the many 
differences between the research design, methods, and methodology of this 
research compared with Martin's. Some of these differences were discussed 
earlier in section 5.7. This section will illustrate the main differences regarding the 
results and their validity. Martin (1997) focused on the increase in the UK oil 
production that arose because of lower taxation, lower cost and other factors. He 
studied the impact of both the 1983 and 1993 petroleum tax relaxations, and the 
effect of the cost reduction resulted from improved technology on the 
developments of new fields. This research traced the historical rationales for the 
three UK petroleum tax relaxations- 1983,1987-88,1993 and tested these 
rationales from an ex-post position. One of the main aims was to evaluate the 
success of the tax relaxation policy, and another aim was to illustrate the financial 
effects of these tax relaxations on the Government tax take and the cash flow of 
oil companies. In his study, Martin (1997) did not take into account the effects of 
abolishing PRT relief. This research did so via examining the effects of 
introducing and, later on, abolishing the Cross Field Allowance on the 
Government's and the oil companies' cash flow. One of the main weaknesses in 
Martin's analysis is that he built his conclusion on an unrealistic analytical 
approach. He related all of the production and the 
Government tax take from 
fields that started production after 1985 primarily to the 1983 and 1993 petroleum 
tax relaxations and the improved technology. This contradicted 
the realty that a 
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number of these fields, which started production after 1985 ' were developed not 
because of the less tax or advanced technology issues, but because of their 
commercial viability without the tax breaks. This research specified the direct 
effects of the petroleum tax relaxations on a number of measures. These measures 
are reflected in an increase in production, the effects on Government tax take, and 
the increase in the cash flow of oil companies, this in its turn helps to evaluate the 
success and validity of the tax relaxation policy. The results of this research agree 
with Martin (1997) in that there were boosts in oil production after 1993 and this 
was at the expense of t* he Government tax take. This point supports the description 
of the UK tax system as a non-proprietorial regime. 
9.5.2 Significance of the Findings with Respect to the Policy 
In section 9.4 the UK's governance of its oil resources was categorised as non- 
proprietorial. The question that may be asked here is whether given that this type 
of governance works for the UK. Mainly that it does not work, that any incentives 
devised by the Government will always be dwarfed by the incentive and 
disincentive effects of movements in oil prices, and that in any event international 
oil companies with global strategies and interests may simply take the proceeds of 
the incentives and invest elsewhere, for example BP. 
From the analysis in this thesis the overall policy lesson for other countries is that 
government intervention to change the fortunes of their oil industry using tax 
breaks is likely to fail. Not only are the effects of such breaks likely to be 
overshadowed by the alternating incentive or disincentive offered by changing oil 
prices, but they will also lose the government revenues to no avail. 
If this is the overall conclusion, were there any components of the relaxations 
which were successful and which might usefully be emulated? Here the 
candidates would be the Cross Field Allowance which stimulated development 
activities and the reduction in PRT in 1993 which clearly stimulated current 
production. However, both of these measures resulted in the sacrifice of actual or 
potential government revenues and thus might only be contemplated 
if other 
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objectives, such as improving the balance of payments were higher on a 
government's agenda. 
These conclusions mean that different, alternatives policies should be considered. 
The thesis provides the following clues to what these might be for the UK 
Government, and which may be of a significant benefit to other oil producing 
countries. The UK Government might have been better off if it had designed its 
tax relaxations according to fields of specific reserve volumes or extraction costs, 
rather than based on certain development consent's dates or geological locations. 
The fiscal regime could be designed in a way that it could extract a specified 
percentage of the oil price to the Government; therefore it could be more flexible 
with changes in oil prices. However, such a system would treat fields from 
different reserve sizes similarly and would not be stable because oil prices change 
rapidly. The most effective fiscal regime would be designed with link to the 
operating profit. This can be done by exempting a certain level of profit from 
being liable to petroleum taxes, and place higher tax percentages on higher profit 
layers. Such a system would treat small and marginal fields favourably compared 
with large and more profitable fields, and will extract higher take from the very 
profitable fields to the Government. Moreover, such a fiscal regime, as it is based 
on operating profits, would take the different costs into account and at the same 
time would be flexible with changes in oil prices. 
The results of this research support the statement that the UK petroleum fiscal 
regime is one of the weakest regimes in the world. They provide a valuable lesson 
for oil producing countries, and in particular the UK, regarding the usefulness and 





. Appendix One 
Transcription of the interview with Mr Geoff Barnarda senior tax officer from 
the Oil Taxation Office on 20 th of JanuM 2004, at 1.00pm 
Q- what were the rationales for the 1983 petroleum tax relaxation package? 
The phasing out of APRT was replaced by the instalment regime under which 
PRT is paid in instalments, replaced it, and the speed of collecting it. 
Royalty was not dealt with by the Inland Revenue, it was the DTI who dealt with 
royalty. As far as I know the rationale behind abolishing it for post 82 fields was 
that it was thought the major fields had been discovered in the North Sea and 
royalty was disincentive to invest, because it takes 12.5 per cent of the gross 
revenues, so by removing it was giving an incentive. Indeed the whole of 83 
changes was to some extent aimed at providing an incentive to further 
exploration. The increase in the oil allowance for PRT meant that smaller fields 
would be more viable to develop because they would not be paying PRT. 
PRT was only intended to tax the super profit of the very large fields, in theory 
some small fields may pay PRT if they are very profitable. Generally, most small 
fields will never pay PRT, and it was never intended that they should; because 
they are generating profit in the sort of normal commercial range not the super 
profit the likes of Forties and Brent fields' developments. 
Q were these changes a necessary action by the Government? 
At the time it was the right action by the government to form the tax relaxation 
package. The North Sea has always been balanced between the government 
receiving its fair share of the revenues from the North 
Sea, at the same time the 
investment has to come from the private sector because since we got rid of the 
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BNOC, all investments have been private. So you are continuingly trying to strike 
a balance, and the North Sea is an expensive province to cooperate. 
When you are looking at international oil companies, they can invest wherever 
they want and find reserves at less cost. So you have to make UK attractive in the 
international context. 
Of course achieving that is not only through tax, but also by the general regime, 
infrastructure, labour supply and everything else. Its an attractive regime to work 
in compared to some other countries. 
Q: what were the rationales for the 1987-88 changes? 
PRT was introduced as a field based tax and there was no intention that you could 
set expenditure from one field against another field. However, when looking at the 
regime in 1987, it was felt there needed to be some incentive towards exploration 
and allowing some costs of one field to be off set against another field would give 
companies that are already paying PRT an incentive to keep exploring. It did not 
benefited companies who were not paying PRT. It was an incentive to continue 
further exploration. 
It certainly led to difficulties later on because the effect of it was unforeseen. 
Revenues by 1993 had dropped to zero because of the volume of relief being 
allowed. But at the time these changes and similarly removing royalty for the 
Southern Basin fields was efflective, and recognition that most of, if not all, the 
major reserves in Southern Basin have been found. And what was going to be 
there is going to be fairly small, and applying royalty to future small fields might 
then meant they would have never been developed. So it was mainly to encourage 
development, because there were a lots of fields discovered forty years ago and 
they have never been developed and tax is one reason but mainly they were too 
small and uneconomic using the technology available at 
time. Now advances in 
technology make them economic. So some of these small 
fields are coming in. 
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Q: were these changes effective? 
The removal of royalty would have helped companies' decision-making when 
these small fields give better rate of return. Companies use the rate of return as 
derive for their investments decision over time and obviously something like 
royalty affects companies investments decision. 
But the question here is: did introducing the Cross Field Allowance encourage 
exploration? Because of rate of tax on PRT paying fields was round about 80 per 
cent if not slightly higher because of accumulated effects of CT and PRT. 
Allowing the Cross Field Allowance meant that almost the entire cost of 
exploration was met by tax relief. So the number of exploration wells drilled 
absolutely rocketed because the government was paying almost the entire cost, 
through tax relief. 
It was not costing the companies anything to drill and that what was led to the 
1993 changes, because of the cost of the cross-field allowance relief, which was 
thought originally to be no more perhaps 20-50 million. 
Abolishing PRT in 1992-93 we were not getting any money and in a one year 92 
we repaid more than what we collected, and that was the direct result of the Cross 
Field Allowance. So the cross-field allowance brought a negative effect on the 
Government revenues. It encouraged exploration but it recurred responsible 
exploration because you can get the relief providing as an exploration well, 
perhaps companies did not target them as accurately. 
Because one of the aims of the PRT regime was to tax super profits far more 
fields have been found than are ever going to pay PRT. So you actually had an 
allowance which was giving relief against a PRT paying field in anticipation of 
the new field paying PRT, yet the new field might be too small even if it came 
into to pay PRT. So effectively you were giving relief and not getting anything 
back. 
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Q: what were the rationales for the 1993 tax relaxation? 
Reducing the PRT rate from 75 to 50 per cent as a part of the 1993 package, we 
also got rid of the Cross Field Allowance. We gave an incentive to the companies 
with PRT paying fields that they were retain a bit more themselves to future 
exploration. The allowance was completely wiping out the receipts, so removing 
it pushed the tax receipts up, and this brought, in a way, the original situation 
before introducing the allowance; and reducing the rate to 50 per cent was to help 
companies to fund future projects. And the fact that new fields would not pay 
PRT gave companies greater reward for the risk they take in exploration. 
The 1993 tax relaxation was certainly formed without any discussion with the 
industry, and when it came they knew nothing about it in advance. 
Transcript of the Interview with Mr Mike ELrp on 23d of December 2003 
(12.00-1.00 -pm) 
What does a tax relaxation mean? 
Packages of measures and is possibly a combination of something look like lighter 
burdening in one area and heavy in another. So there is a considerable difficulty 
when you look at individual measures, which are lighter, or over a package which 
is refocusing maybe. 
Describing major changes: 
(93) 
- abolishing PRT was a major reduction 
in burden. 
- Removing Cross 
Filed Allowance, in someway, you can see ... to serve 
some kind of activity. 
- Measure the effect. 
(83) 
(87) 
Not major changes or significant. 
Ujint pre the rationales for the thEee relaxations? 
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Rationales of the 1983 changes are to boost the industry's activity as there have 
been a period of rapid discovery and development of fields, and number of fields 
have been discovered and have not been put forward development. Here we have 
to find out what was the real reason of developing fields whether it was tax 
relaxation or something else like improving technology or providing a better 
infrastructure and it's better to go case by case, and it's a difficult job to isolate 
the impact of changes. 
The driver of 1983 tax relaxation was the level of activity. What the stains of 
development? Is it the stock of existing discoveries? Why would not existing 
discoveries being developed as soon as they would be able to? Why over time a 
lot of existing discoveries being eventually developed? Development decisions 
based on combination of technology and availability of infrastructure. 
Relaxation of 1983 would have given some stimulation to development of some 
fields. Royalty is non-profit related and without it the system is being made more 
profit related and without it we are having more sensitive regime. 
Many fields have been discovered and suddenly they have been developed after 
1983. As there still the improvement in technology, accumulated experience, and 
the availability and capacity of the infrastructure which had spread in the North 
Sea over time. 
To isolate the individual effects you should look at individual cases and speak to 
people who know the details of particular fieldsand what were the reasons to put 
fields forward at certain time. It is still difficult to do this because of the number 
of fields and the time of development of these 
fields, and you need to ask why 
development of these fields did not go earlier. The other difficulty 
is that number 
of these fields have been developed by group of companies. 
Sometimes a decision 
of developing certain fields is a discovery of another 
field in the area and then it 
might be worth creating the necessary inftastructure which 
might be the main 
reason of developing this field. 
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The 1983 changes are probably not successful as they might plan to be. Then oil 
price changes have influenced the activity during that period. 
Looking at oil price in Sterling pound have totally different history which give 
different impression. 
(1993) 
1993 tax relaxation took place to encourage investing even in old fields, and this 
to create incentive for companies to keep investing in old fields in a way to keep 
balance between investing in new and old fields. 
Suggestions in 1997, in the 1988 budget, 6 pages in the press release outlined in 
little details alternative measure packages options did not go forward. 
1992 the PRT cost the government money. 
Licensing rounds affected the activities. 
1993 changes have never came as a result of any pressure of influence of the 
industry as changes in 1993 came from the Treasury and the Inland Revenue and 
formed a shock to the DTI as changes have not been discussed with the DTI at 
that time. So changes came mainly from the government. 
332 
Appendix Two 
As was mentioned in Chapter Five the GEM allows running fields' calculations 
against different fiscal and price assumptions. The following sections will explain 
briefly how the GEM performs the above two functions. It will start with building 
different fiscal scenarios and then talk about building price scenarios. 
ADDendix 2-1 
Calculating Fields' Parameters based on Different Fiscal Scenarios 
The main page of the GEM contains three assumptions, which are: Assets (Oil 
and Gas fields), Company and Price as can be seen from the following window. 
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, Defaults 
ý Modify Selected Project 
ý Create Nevy Project 
ý Add Existing Project to List 
ý Remove Project from List 
ý Getting Started with GEM k Methodology 
About GEM 
ý What's New in GEM ý Economics Assumptions Email GEM 
ý GEM WebCasts Online ý GEM News Online n74m, 
ýý P 






If it is required to calculate the financial parameters 
for any field according to a 
certain tax regime then the following steps are to 
be performed: 
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Project folder - C: ýWOODMACýGEMý 
I- Click on asset to get the following screen: 








I, -, Data_ I Data Extrac tI pal Ld a 
I Select calculation type 
Assets in their own tax regime 
Assets in any tax regimes 
Company's Interests in Assets 





Select regimes All 3 Select assets to calculate a, ati 
Callctilation Options 




F Economic Cutoff F Breakeven 
F Calculate Sensitivities 
r Real Nominal 
Paid Earned 
Stand Alone Tax Synergies 
Price Scenario: 
Save Reports In: 0 Personal 
2- Select the data tab from the above dialogue box, then United Kingdom to 
have all the fields, and after that select the field you want to do calculations for, 
and click on Open Selected Asset to have the next screen shown: 

















































T is age agowS you to viewledit an existing asset or 
create a new Of 
iiý Hell) I. t asSets by us" the Control 
key, CreatejDalate an asset by usir 





0 Create a New Asset 
0, Delete selected Assets 




When a field's file is open then by clicking on the "Tax Marker" icon on the tool 
bar menu it gives a dialogue box allows choosing from one of nine tax regimes. 
3 'Tears Pd UqUid I Gas! Gas 2 Pric eI Price I Price 2 Costs Faclillies Equip. 
4 CMS/LG ProbV4 
5 0.0 70.2.24.2 0 30 2 0.0 5.0 5.0 
6 IBY=2004 000bld mmefd mmcfd $ fbbi $Imcf Slmcf fm fm fm 
92 1 3 26 
1992 2 3.22 -- 10 1993 1 2,84 1.06 5ý00 5.00 
11 1993 2 30.00 2.88 2.88 -- 
12 1994 1 60.00 2,93 IS5 
13 1994 2 34.00 3,08 3.18 
14 1995 1 78.00 3.13 2.21 
is 1995 2 700 3,20 1.57 
16 1996 1 37.00 3.21 1.68 
17 1996 2 23.00 3,39 2.40 
18 1997 1 - 349 2.02 
19 1997 2 10.00 153 1.93 
20 1998 1 20.00 3.64 1.78 
121 1998 2 1100 3.56 2.09 
22 1999 1 13.00 3,31 1.57 
123 1999 2 12.24 3.27 1.73 
24 2000 1 17.54 3 
ý07 
2.37 
25 200D 2 7.39 3.09 3.66 
26 2001 1 11.52 3 32 3.54 
14 4H \Fieldý Data / Field Info Tax Info Tariff Payments / Tanff Receipts /Notes 
Draw A&Lto5hapes - foil 
Project: Wood Mackenzie Read-Only Data 
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14j 
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Offshore - License rounds I to 4 
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onshore licence pre-76-Annex B post-114/82 
Onshore licence pre-76-Annex B pre-114182 
onshore licence between 1976 and 1982 
Onshore licence post-82-Annex B pre-1613193 
After choosing the required tax regime and saving it and closing the opened 
window, select the Calculate tab. Here we can 
do the required calculation based 
on the fiscal regime we have chosen, and according to a selected price scenario as 
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Discount Rate: % 
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The "Set Report" icon on the above window allows choosing required reports, and 















P, Summary Cash Flow 
Pý PV Table 
P0 Expanded Cash Flow 
W Pre-Tax Cash Flow 
P Government Take Cash Flow 
90 Standard Cash Flow 
P0 Entitlement Cash Flow 
r 
W Tax Reports (where available) 
W Half-Annual Reports (UK Only) 
Create Standard Charts: 
F Total Production 
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Operating Costs 
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page alýows you to select what reports are produced and 
wna( currer 
J options can be set on the 
DefaLdts mode, For more information click 
here. 
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oduction units are shown in the reports. The del 
Close P. - 
Clicking on process button performs the asset's calculations and gives the 
following reports: 
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J R ci 
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00 t/yr bcf/yr $M $M $M $M $M $M $M $M 
1995 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.2 0.0 O'c 0.0 0.0 -23.2 
1995 2 0,0 2,2 4,2 1.9 18.4 0,01 0.0 0.0 0.0 -16.1 
1996 1 0.0 12.8 24.1 5.5 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 18.6 
1996 2 0.0 12.4 24.3 5.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.8 
1997 1 0.0 15,0 29.7 6.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.3 
1997 2 0.0 1.6 3.6 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 -2.1 
1998 1 0.0 3.7 7.3 2.4 D'o D'o 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 
1998 2 0,0 1.8 3.5 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.91 -5.1 
1999 1 0.0 2.6 4.6 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.01-- 2.7 
1999 2 0.0 2.4 4.3 1.9, 0.0 D. 0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.8 
2000 1 0.0 3.4 5.6 2.1 1.8 0,0 0,0 0.0 0.3 1.4 
2000 2 0.0 2.2 3.5 1.6 1.7 0.0 H H 0.7 -0.4 
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Pre Tax- 
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Appendix 2-1 
Calculatinv- Fields' Parameters based on Different Oil Price Scenarios 
To build up a new price scenario, from the main page of the GEM select the Price, 
the following window will come out: 
* Project 









P Edit Price Scenarios Globaky 
Create a New Price Scenario 
[Delete selected Price Scenarios 
01 Open selected Price Scenarios 
CI os e 
Then select Create a New Price Scenario option, and the following window 
should appear. 
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Enter a suitable name for the new scenario, select the regime of interest (UK in 
our case), and choose Base as the scenario to base your new price file on. Then 
press Create, and the result will be the following window. 
H84 = C84/D84 
A""'' B C E_ F- G ------ -- K L M -0 




ChanUes made on thi-is pmje vAlautom atically be fed 
1 throkJohlo the* price page. 
2 Brent $/k VC I BY=2004 Interest 0111 Gas Gas Gas ON ON Gas ON Gas 
3 Year Pd $ price Rate Reds Inflation Rates Brent ProlYO4 1983 Valiant Flags Au*ey AffW" Brert Vilting 
2005 1 2500 1,60 1 45 1,24 S 00 15,93 1 21 3,93 124 2.84 jj 2JU 2,58 
85 2005 2 25.00 1,60 1.45 1.24 F1.00 15.63 2,1 2 3.89 3.20 2.81 3.29 2.29 2,28 2.58 
86 2006 1 21.54 1.60 1.45 1.24 5.00 13.46 1.95 3.84 3.17 2.78 325 227 2.31 2.57 
87 2006 2 21.54 1.60 1.45 1.24 5,00 13.46 1 ý95 
3.76 310 2.72 3.16 2-24 2,34 2S4 
88 2007 1 22.08 1.60 1.45 1.24 5.00 13,80 1,89 3.66 3.0`1 2.65 310 220 2,37 2.51 
69 2007 2 22D8 1,60 1.45 1.24 500 13.80 1.89 3.63 2.99 2,63 3.07 2.19 2.40 2.50 
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2.59 
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99 2012 2 2498 1.60 1.45 1.24 5.00 15V 2.14 4V 3 30 2.90 3.39 2.43 2.71 2.79 
1100 
2013 1 25.60 1.60 1.45 1.24 5,00 16ý00 2.19 4.06 3,34 2,94 3.44 2.46 2.75 2.82 
1101 2013 2 25.60 1,60 1.45 1,24 5.00 16.00 2.19 4.11 3.39 2.97 3.48 2.49 2.78 2.86 
1102 2014 1 26.24 1.60 1.45 124 5.00 16.40 2.24 4.16 3.43 3.01 3.52 2.52 2.81 2.89 
ý103 2014 2 26.24 1.60 1.45 1.24 500 16.40 2.24 4.21 
3.47 3.05 3.56 2.55 2.85 2.93 
ý104 2015 1 26-90 1,60 1.45 1.24 5.100 16.81 2,30 4.26 3.51 3.08 3.61 2.58 2,88 
2,96 
j105 2015 2 26-90 1.60 1,45 1,24 SW 16.81 2.30 4.32 3.56 
3.12 3,65 2.61 2.92 3.00 
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Proiect: Wood Mackenzie Read-Only Data 
Prices under column (H) refer to Brent, and these can be changed and saved. 
By following the above steps and saving the results and new price scenario will be 
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Table 2: Data Regarding Oil Fields Developed Between Appril 1982-87 
(Rationale No 4) 









ALWYNE NORTH POST- 
1983 Northern North Sea Oct-82 677.7 10.32 13.4 
ALWYNE NORTH pOST- 
1983 9.96 13.4 
C LYD E Post- 1983 Central North Sea Dec-82 153.8 6.26 8.19 
CLYDE Pre-1983 6.08 8.19 
PETRONEL Post- 1983 Central North Sea Apr-86 48.4 108.23 120.25 
PETRONEL Pre-1983 86.44 120.25 
ROB ROY Post- 1983 Central North Sea Jan-86 123.2 23.38 30.58 
ROBROY Pre-1983 20.1 30.58 
IVANHOE Post-1983 Central North Sea Jan-86 80 29.05 34.86 
IVANHOE Pre-1983 22.75 34.86 
EIDER Post-1983 Northern North Sea Oct-85 ill 16.79 21.54 
EIDER Pre-1983 15.88 21.54 
SCAPA Post- 1983 Central North Sea Sep-85 127 45.98 51.98 
SCAPA Pre- 1983 36.81 51.98 
TERN Post-1983 Northern North Sea Feb-85 288 16.13 21.58 
TERN Pre-1983 15.21 21.85 
CYRUS Post- 1983 Central North Sea Nov-84 26.9 # 1.38 
CYRUS Pre-1983 # 1.38 
INNES Post-1983 Central North Sea Nov-84 6.2 20.57 25.43 
INNES Pre-1983 13-67 25.43 
Deveron Post-1983 Northern North Sea Sep-84 17.1 171.52 190.11 
Deveron Pre- 1983 146.31 190.11 
BALMORAL Post- 1983 Central North Sea Dec-83 113.6 8.74 10.75 
BaIMORAL Pre-1983 8.48 10.75 
DUNCAN post-1983 Central North Sea Sep-83 18.1 15.96 26.96 
DunCAN Pre-1983 2.57 26.96 
HIGHLANDER Post- 
1983 
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1980 Exploration 0 19 7 0 6 
Appraisal 0 13 8 0 1 
Development 0 45 77 0 0 
1981 Exploration 1 37 7 0 2 
Appraisal 1 15 10 0 0 
Development 4 39 94 0 0 
1982 Exploration 9 36 11 4 3 
Appraisal 8 24 11 0 0 
Development 11 36 71 0 0 
1983 Exploration 9 45 9 1 4 
Appraisal 17 18 13 3 0 
Development 10 34 51 0 0 
1984 Exploration 24 53 20 1 5 
Appraisal 19 44 13 0 0 
Development 18 37 51 2 0 
1985 Exploration 17 48 19 1 8 
Appraisal 24 26 13 0 1 
Development 28 49 47 9 0 
1986 Exploration 12 34 16 1 7 
Appraisal 17 13 10 0 0 
Development 32 15 34 4 0 
1987 Exploration 20 30 13 2 3 
Appraisal 16 23 23 0 0 
Development 37 31 52 4 0 
rS-ource: 
DTI, The Brown Book, Appendix 2 (1980-1987). 
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Table 7: Offshore Oil Field Discovered During the Period April 1982-87 (Rational No. 4) 
Reserves 
Field Name Discovery 
Date Oil (mmbbls) 
Gas Total Oil 
(mmboe) Reserve Size 
as (bcf) mmboe reserve 
Alba Dec-84 450 0 0 450 Large 
Birch Oct-85 32 52 9.17 41.17 Very Small 
Brimmond Jun-85 3 0 0.00 3 Very Small 
Chanter Sep-85 4 16 2.82 4.38 Very Small 
Gannet E Jun-82 42 3 0.53 42.07 Very Small 
Glamis Nov-82 18 0 0.00 18 Very Small 
Guillemot 
Northwest Jul-85 35 120 21.16 37.82 Very Small 
Larch Mar-86 10 0 0.00 10 Very Small 
Leven Oct-83 9 0 0.00 9 Very Small 
Miller Mar-83 315 450 79.34 325.58 Medium 
Ness May-86 40 0 0.00 40 Very Small 
Rob Roy May-84 175 45 7.93 176.06 Small 
Rubie Mar-85 7 0 0.00 7 Very Small 
Scott Jan-84 450 180 31.73 454.23 Large 
Sedgwick Nov-85 19 0 0.00 19 Very Small 
Skua Jun-86 25 16 2.82 25.38 Very Small 
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Table 9: Governmental Take During the Period April 1982-1993 (Rational No. 5) 
Field Name Pre-B udget Post-Budget 
EM $M EM $M 
Alwyn North 167.3 291.1 167.3 291.1 
Clyde 27.3 62.9 29.5 51.3 
Petronel 150.8 264.6 80.8 142.3 
Robroy 143.8 251.8 113.7 197.4 
Ivanhoe 115.1 202.9 56.9 99.4 
Eider 84.7 146.6 82.8 146.6 
Scapa 135.9 224.9 77 142.1 
Tern 0 0 0 0 
Cyrus 0 0 0 0 
Innes 18.1 0 10.5 18.1 
Deveron 68.9 103.9 55.9 86.2 
Balmoral 45.5 79.4 36.8 63.8 
Duncan 73.6 848, 
_k 
55.4 
Highlander 400.2 648.3 240.1 400.7 
Totals 1339.5 2276.4 995.3 1694.4 





(The Application of The Cross Field Allowance scenario) 
The following steps show an example of the procedures used in applying the 
Cross Field Allowance scenario. It presents number of reports and screens from 
the GEM (2004) that were used in this application and also the calculations that 
were applied. 
Using the GEM (2004) to run the calculations and reports for Chanter oil field 
under a 10 per cent real disc ount rate gives number of reports, one of these reports 
is the Annual Summary Cash Flow, and this is presented in the following 
diagram. 
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Eile Edit View Insert Fpat lools ýata ýindow telp 
+, 0 0- Arial , io ,BIU==M. - ý, A , 0 % . 00;. 
h 
4StartGEM Shortcuts, Close All Files Print Open Reports 
Al Field Narne'. 
ý, B 
I lHeld Hank 
2 




Cieated On: 27-Jun-05 
P 
Year Production Gross Op Capital Royalty SPD/ PRT Corp. Total Field 
Liquids Gas Revenue Costs Costs APRT Tax Cash Flow 
7 000t/yr bcfiyr im im W im im N im im 
8 
9 1991 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -23.7 
10 1992 0,0 0.0 0,0 0.0 8.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -8.5 
11 1993 225.0 0.0 23.6 6.2 5.6 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 11.9 
12 1994 100.0 0.0 9.6 5.9 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 -0.3 
1 13 1995 100.0 6.9 23,2 10.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.9 
14 1996 11H 3,8 20,9 7.5 7.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 
115 1997 90.0 0.9 103 5.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 4.3 
-1"6, 1998 31.3 0.2 2.3 3.3 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 1.5 -2.5 
I7 1999 21,8 1,0 4.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 D'O -0,5 1.5 
_ 18 2000 93 0,0 1.4 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
19 2001 7.8 0,0 i'D 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -01 0.1 
20 2002 4.7 0,0 H 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 -01 0.1 
211- 2003 1.3 0.01 0.2 0,2 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 
- 22 - 2004 2.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0,0 0.0 O'D 0.0 0.0 0.0 
213 2005 132.5 0.0 14,1 2.1 5,2 0,0 0,0 0.0 1.3 5.5 
24 2006 80.7 -1 0.0 T2 1.4 0.0 0,0 0.0 0,0 2.4 3.4 
11 215 2007 46.1 0.0 41 0.8 0.0 0,0 0,0 0.0 1.8 1.5 
26 2008 28.8 0.0 2.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 to 1.0 
27 2009 17.3 0.0 1.6 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 D'O 0,6 0.5 
28, 2010 5.8 0.0 H 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 03 0.0 
11 29 1 2011 0.0 0,0 0,0 0.0 7.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -7,3 
30 2012 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0,6 0.6 
III 44 
in 4 11 nn 
H\Annual Summary Cash Fllqw 
nnnn 




Expanded Cash FW 
"', - r) n -nn 
Annual Re-Tax Cash Flow 
n--, n r) n 
AnnA- GM Take Cash Fk 
Prniprt, Wnnd MAiPn7iPPPAH-nn1v W; 
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By using the Annual Summary Cash Flow from the GEM (2004), the Cross Field 
Allowance scenario could be applied as the following example. 
The above report was extracted from the GEM (2004) for Chanter oil field under its 
base mood, 'original fiscal conditions'. The repoit shows the capital costs, which 
represent the development costs. This field obtained development consent in 
December 1987, and should have benefited from the Cross Field Allowance, 
development expenditure started in 1991 as can be seen from the above report. The 
following table shows the calculations. 
Development Costs 10 % of the 75% of the 10% Year 
EM Development Costs Development Costs 
EM EM 
1991 23.7 2.37 1,7775 
1992 8.5 0.85 0,6375 
Total; EM 32.2 3.22 2.415 
The fourth column shows the benefit of the Cross Field Allowance to a receiving 
field. This benefit will be used to adjust the benefiting field's costs, which will be 
reflected as an increase in the field's cash flow and MR. 
Using the data tab in the GEM (2004) to amend Chanter's data, reducing the yearly 
development costs by the above-mentioned figures, and then running the 
calculations gives the required scenario. The following diagrams show these steps. 
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-- -- r--- KM m 
By clicking on open, we move to the following screen: 
81 1991 1 1 900 1 6.01 220 
200 3 00 2 C, O 
9 1991 2 1920 1617 215 200 
3,00 1 00 
10 1992 1 1807 15.22 229 1.00 
2.00 
11 1992 2 18.71 15.75 228 1.00 2.00 
12 1993 1 2.00 17.39 14.64 2. C2 1.00 
2.00 
13 1993 2 7.00 15.06 12,68 2.06 
1.00 - 
14 1994 1 3,00 14.32 12.06 209 - 
3.00 
15 1994 2 1.00 16.00 13.47 2.23 - 
16 1995 1 2.00 20.00 16.79 14.14 2.29 
17 1995 2 200 1800 15,89 1338 231 
IB 1996 11 00 13.00 1820 15.33 225 
3M 
19 1996 2 300 0.60 8M 21 ý36 
17,98 242 3.00 
20 1997 1 200 OAO 4.00 18,86 1588 2,46 - 
21 1997 21 00 0,20 1.00 17.85 15.03 257 
22 1998 1 030 0,20 0.30 13,40 11ý29 252 
23 1996 2 055 0.20 0.82 12ý07 1016 2.55 
24 1999 1 0,15 0.04 1.61 12ý96 1091 248 
25 1999 2 060 0.08 3.61 21,62 1821 2,50 
26 2000 1 019 0.01 - 2575 
21.56 241 
27 2000 2 015 0 ý02 
29.15 2454 2.25 
28 2001 1 017 0,03 2551 21 48 223 
29 2001 2 CIA 0 0.02 21.43 19.05 2.24 
30 2002 1 0,09 0.01 2125 1874 2.26 
31 2002 2 008 0.00 25.49 21 ý46 
2.43 
32 2003 1-- 27.18 22 B9 2,50 
33 2003 2 005 0.00 27,46 23,12 2.59 
14 01 ýField Data ý R4d Info Tax Info Tariff Payments 
/Notes 
m_j_j. o. -4-n, 6 nzi.. 
kl 
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Now, figures under Field Capex, ' capital expenditure' , can be amended by reducing 
them by the results we obtained in the above table. By saving the work under a 
certain name and running the calculations just as normal under a 10 per cent real 
discount rate, the scenario will be applied and all the required results will be arrived 
at including MR, annual cash flow, and annual Government cash flow for Chanter 
oil field. 
Offshore Oil Fields Discovered Before 1987, but Developed After that Date 
Oil Fields Discovered Before 1987 but Developed After this Date (85 Fields) 
Field name 
Discovery 
date Field name 
Discovery 
date Field name 
Discovery 
date Field name 
Discovery 
date 
Hewett Nov-66 Pierce Mar-76 Heley Feb-81 Scott Jan-84 
Gannet F Mar-69 Machar Apr-76 Ettrick Apr-81 iviarnOC; K- 
-(ZLei in 
Feb-84 
Arbroath Dec-69 Renee Apr-76 Joanne May-81 Markham Jul-84 
Montrose Nov-71 Skene May-76 Puffin Sep-81 Alba Dec-84 
Kingfisher Jun-72 Columba'E' Jun-76 Kittwake Sep-81 Rubie Mar-85 
Beryl 'A' Sep-72 Thelma Jul-76 Emerald Oct-81 Brimmond Jun-85 
Dunlin Jul-73 Don Jul-76 Ross Dec-81 Staffa Jul-85 
Dunbar Nov-73 Columba'B' Nov-76 Everest Mar-82 Guillernot NW Aug-85 
Heather Dec-73 Captain May-77 Iona Mar-82 Chanter Sep-85 
Osprey Feb-74 Clair Jul-77 Gannet'E' Jun-82 Orion Oct-85 
Andrew Jun-74 Toni Aug-77 Gannet'C' Sep-82 Birch Oct-85 
Nevis Aug-74 Otter Oct-77 Vanguard Nov-82 Neptune Nov-85 
Galley Oct-74 Gannet A Apr-78 Clipper North Feb-83 
Sedgwick Dec-85 
Tartan Jan-75 Bressay Sep-78 Miller Mar-83 Ensign Dec-85 
Mable Feb-75 Guillemot N Nov-78 Angus Mar-83 Larch Mar-86 
Strathspey Mar-75 Buckland Mar-79 Barque May-83 Penguin 'D' Apr-86 
Crawford Apr-75 Medwin May-79 Blair Jun-83 Ness May-86 
Lyell Jun-75 Tiffany Jul-79 Keith Aug-83 Chestnut Oct-86 
Penguin'c' Jul-75 Gannet'B' Sep-79 Leven Oct-83 Fyne Dec-86 
Pelican Aug-75 Guillemot A Dec-79 Cook Nov-83 
Britannia Sep-75 Stirling Mar-80 
Murchison Sep-75 Carnoustie Apr-80 
Penguin 'a' I Dec-75 Columba'D' May-80 
Source: DTI (1999a), appendix 3. 
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Appendix 4-2 
Annual Summaly Cash Flow for All fields in the UKCS 
101 File Edit View Insert Format Tools ýata ýýinclow telp 
Ra Arial 10 BI U_ FA % '020 +'S ; _9 
A 
A Zý 100% zA 
Start GEM Shortcuts v Close All Files 16 Print Open Reports 
S5 
ABCDEFGHKP 
1 ýColnpdny Name: allfields Cieated On: 13-Jun-05 
2 
3 ýCalculation Modeý Real Paid 
Year Production Gross 0p Capital Royalty SPO/ PRT Corp, Cash' 
Liquids Gas Revenue Costs Costs APPT Tax Fiow 
7 000t/yr bcf/yr Em fm NN fm NNN 
9 1965 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 85.5 0.0 0.0 H 0.0 -85.5 10 1966 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 584.3 0.0 0.0 H00 -564.3 1967 0.0 8.2 11.2 29.7 579.1 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 -597,6 
_12,1968 
3.2 71.7 110.5 80A 615.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -785.2 1969 13.1 161.0 264.1 135.3 590.0 5.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 -4671 14 
, 
1970 35.4 398.1 545,8 172.4 708.9 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -340.7 1971 59,2 657.0 777.2 184.9 715.3 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -173.0 16 1972 160.6 940.2 1162.9 232.6 885.2 79.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 -34.3 
_17 
1973 210.8 1024.5 1336.9 252.1 1520.3 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -535.5 18 1974 258.2 1235.4 1524.0 250.7 3944.4 129.2 0.0 0.0 H -2800,3 
-19 
1975 1410.8 1315.2 1730.7 349.8 7470.1 140.4 0.0 0.0 0,0 -6229-6 20 1976 12044.2 1387.2 4713.4 832,7 9888.2 357.7 0,0 0,0 0.0 -6365.2 1977 38888.1 1424.7 11483.1 1355.6 9620.8 1125A 0,0 0,0 0.0 -616.8 1978 55044.5 1354.7 13276.7 1664,0 82243 1164.3 0.0 742A 0.0 1481.2 
_23 
1979 78866.9 1376.7 218113 1976,0 5927.5 1839.8 H 2813.5 0.0 9254.6 
'24,: 
1980 81295.1 1243.6 290657 2150.2 6278.5 M. 5 0,0 6357.7 0.0 11355.7 
25 1981 90950.7 1240.5 35081.5 2612,2 6937.7 3698.2,3964.1 6690.1 3305.7 7883.5 
26 1982 101784.8 1334.6 36905.3 3153.4 7462.6 3828.0 5396.6 7389.6 4493.2 5181.9 
27 1983 114059.6 1278.4 40928.2 3682.9 6447.0 4232.7 5762.5 9612.8 4226.7 6963.5 
28 1984 125472.6 1256.1 48192.3 4350.3 6322.0 5100.3 4771 A 11694.1 5531.8 10422.5 
29 1985 127939.2 1382.1 45694.7 4825.3 6109.4 4727.7 4124.7 12088.1 7131.1 6688.3 
30 1986 127914.9 1436.4 22965.8 45570 6107.8 2000 1 1262ý6 6249.7 6382.4 -3593.7 
31 1987 125323.2 1565.0 23883.9 4438.2 4685.3 2070.7 -297.4 5701.2 2660.6 4625.4 
32 1988 117029.2 1439.9 16967.0 2713.0 4046.7 1328.2 -510.1 6207.3 2289.8 892,0 
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Calculating oil and gas companies and fields liabilities to PRT per tonne of oil 
equivalent over the period 1990-2000. 
BP 
Year Production Tax P ents 
Oil MVY Gas bcf/y mtoe PRT EM PRT Vt 
1990 19.6596 250.1 25.54 857.5 33.6 
1991 181837 260.1 24.30 887.2 36.5 
1992 19.4166 249.6 25.28 684.6 27.1 
1993 20.0465 310.5 27.35 691.9 25.3 
1994 23.4147 317.1 30.87 539.2 17.5 
1995 21.9803 327.6 29.68 527.5 17.8 
1996 22.5669 427.8 32.62 783.2 24.0 
1997 21.1183 420.2 31.00 643.5 20.8 
1998 25.0208 378.2 33.91 368 10.9 
1999 29.6981 490.8 41.23 260 6.3 
2000 1 27.1553 607.9 1 41.44 639.2 15.4 
Exxonmobil 
Y Production Tax 
Payments 
ear Oil mt/Y Gas bcf/y mtoe PRT EM PRT E/t 
1990 11.0924 150.8 14.64 547.1 37.4 
1991 13.6118 186.2 17.99 273.5 15.2 
1992 14.3759 218.7 19.52 299.6 15.4 
1993 14.717 227.3 20.06 345.6 17.2 
1994 15.2078 185.5 19.57 89.1 4.6 
1995 16.2583 187.7 20.67 110.6 5.4 
1996 16.6505 246.8 22.45 203.7 9.1 
1997 15.0823 276.4 21.58 290.8 13.5 
1998 15.7746 283.6 22.44 132.9 5.9 
1999 15.5355 356.6 23.92 68.6 2.9 
2000 16.3709 590.0 30.26 344 11.4 
ChevronTexaco 
Production Tax Payments 
Year Oil mt/y Gas bcf/y mtoe PRT: EM PRT E/t 
1990 3.9892 7.3 4.16 159.4 38.3 
1991 3.4501 6.9 3.61 140.7 39.0 
1992 3.316 8 3.50 106.5 30.4 
1993 3.0471 7.7 3.23 104.4 32.3 
1994 3.8401 7.8 4.02 66.2 16.5 
1995 3.7285 7.3 3.90 80.9 20.7 
1996 2.4393 7.4 2.61 52.5 20.1 
1997 1.9318 6.2 2.08 45.2 21.8 
1998 1.8689 18.9 2.31 23.9 10.3 
1999 2.0536 71.9 3.74 10.7 2.9 




Year Production Tax P ents 
Oil mt/y Gas bcf/y mtoe PRT EM PRT Vt 
1990 0.3228 0.1 0.33 0.3 0.9 
1991 0.5089 0.4 0.52 -0.4 -0.8 1992 0.6499 0.5 0.66 0 0.0 
1993 0.5482 0.4 0.56 0 0.0 
1994 0.65 0.6 ' 0.66 0 0.0 
1995 1.0901 2 1.14 24.8 21.8 
1996 1.1961 3 1.27 24.4 19.3 
1997 1.1518 3.8 1.24 3 2%5. % 20.4 1998 1.0025 2.8 1.07 14.7 13.8 
1999 0.8759 2.4 0.93 13.2 14.2 
2000 
tO. 
7753 1.9 0.82 22.8 27.8 
Shell 
Year Production Tax P ents 
Oil mt/y Gas bcf/y mtoe PRT EM PRT FA 
1990 11.0924 150.8 14.64 543 37.1 
1991 13.6118 186.2 17.99 271.4 15.1 
1992 14.3759 218.7 19.52 295.5 15.1 
1993 14.7129 227.3 20.06 341.8 17.0 
1994 15.2005 
_1 
85.5 19.56 88.8 4.5 
1995 16.2826 187.7 20.69 110.6 5.3 
1996 16.643 246.8 22.44 203.7 9.1 
1997 15.134 276.4 21.63 290.8 13.4 
1998 17,0488 283.5 23.71 132 5.6 
1999 17.9318 345.5 26.05 67.9 2.6 
2000 16.6607 396.4 25.98 283.5 10.9 
Viking 
Production Tax Payments Year Oil mt/y Gas bcf/y mtoe PRT EM PRT Eft 
1990 0.0497 57.3 1.40 5.1 3.7 
1991 0.0248 38.3 0.93 16.8 18.2 
1992 0.0248 43.8 1.05 1.4 1.3 
1993 0.0248 26.5 0.65 -2.3 -3.6 
1994 0.0248 24.1 0.59 14.6 24.7 
1995 0 19.2 0.45 1.9 4.2 
1996 23.7 0.56 
- 
1.8 3.2 
1997 0 23.9 0.56 1.3 2.3 
1998 0 14.9 0.35 -0.9 -2.6 
1999 1 0 19.3 0.45 -1.7 -3.7 
2000 1 0 ' 16.4 0.39 0 0.0 
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Appendix 5-2 
Date: Thu, 8 Sep 2005 10: 43: 48 +0100 
From. "Earp Mike (Mr HMJ)" <Mike. Earngdti., Rsi. gov. uk>4 
To: 'H Abdo' <ecP02haO) she ffi el d. ac. uk>* 
Subject: RE: poster 
Haf ez 
As I said before, I don't know the details of any of the decisions 
so I can't say for sure if or how the tax change in March 1993 
affected the companies, plans. It does, though, seem unlikely that 
they could come forward with a worked-up plan in just a few months, 
especially for a major investment. 
Mike 
----- Original Message ----- 
From: H Abdo [mailto:! ý(ýý2hýa. @sheýfield. ac. uk] 
Sent: 07 September 2005 18: 13 
To: Earp Mike (Mr HMJ) 
Subject: RE: poster 
Dear Mr Mike 
thank you very much for these valuable information. so can I not 
consider that the redevelopment decisions of the 10 fields I 
mentioned in the previous email were not taken because of the 1993 
petroleum tax reforms because such decisions need long time of 
discussion between oil companies and the DTI, and they cannot come 
quickly as a respond to such a tax reform. 
thank you one more 
yours, 
Hafez 
Quoting "Earp Mike (Mr HMJ) 11 <Mike. Earp@dti. gsi. gov. uk>: 
Haf ez 
Not sure why you chose (only) the fields you mentioned. I'm not at 
all surprised at what you found about the Brent redevelopment. Our 
approval comes at the end of a sometimes-long period of preparation 
of plans. I'd be surprised if any of your projects came forward 
quickly as a result of a tax change - but I have no detailed 
knowledge of any of them and i doubt if anyone in DTI (or the 
companies concerned! ) does now. It's easier for tax to stop a 
project in the short term. You'd be better off looking at projects 
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in the years after 1993 (and 1994). 
Mike 
----- Original Message ----- 
From: H Abdo [mailto: ecpl02ha@sheffield. ac. uk] 
> Sent: 02 September 2005 17: 37 
To: Mike. Earp@dti. gsi. gov. uk 
Subject: RE: poster 
dear Mr Mike 
thank you for your email. 
One of the 1993 petroleum tax relaxation rationales was "create 
incentives for oil companies to invest in old fields". 
I understand the reinvestment in old fields as extension or 
redevelopment to these fields to extend their producing lives. I 
found that in 1993-94 ten oil fields were revised and obtained 
development consents from the DTI. What I am trying to find now is a 
link between the 1993 tax relaxation and the decisions for 
redevelopments of these fields. There is scarcity in information 
available here and there regard this matter. However, I found that 
the redevelopment decision of Brent field was made in 1992, which 
means the 1993 tax relaxation was not the reason for this 
reinvestment. I am now trying to track the other fields, and wish I 
will find some help and guidance from you. 




Quoting &lt; &gt;: 
Hafez 
Colin has passed your e-mail on to me. I'm not clear what 
information you're after regarding these fields. I suspect that much 
of it would be commercially confidential. We explain on the web 
(at 
http: //www. og. dti. gov. uk/regulation/guidance/reg offshore/ 
index. htm) 
our procedures for approving field development programmes 
(including 
addendums to them when there are significant changes to 
the approved 
development programme). 
All the best, 
Mike 
This e-mail has been sent by: 
MJ Earp 
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Senior Economist - North Sea Tax and Infrastructure 
Energy Markets Unit 
Department of Trade and Industry 
1 Victoria Street 
London 
SW1H OET 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7215 5271 
Fax: +44 (0)20 7215 5228 
e-mail: Mike. Earp@dti. gsi. gov. uk 
-----original message ----- 
From: H Abdo [mailto: ecp02ha@sheffield. ac. uk] 
Sent: 02 September 2005 12: 33 
To: colin. cranfield@dti. gsi. gov. uk 
Subject: poster 
Dear Sir/Madam 
I am a PhD student at Sheffield University. my topic is about the 
UK petroleum fiscal regime. I saw your poster regard "extension of 
field life and prevention of premature COP" on the internet. . 
I am interested to know more about reinvesting in old fields, as 
part of my research is looking at reinvestment in offshore oils 
after 1993 in the UKCS. I figured out ten redevelopments in Wytch 
Farm, Brent, Tern, Scott, Claymore, Scapa, Brae South, Osprey South 
West and Magnus. 
I will be grateful if you can guide me to any information and 
resources regard the above fields redevelopment consents decisions 
and plans, also to the DTI views of these redevelopments. 





Ap plying a PRT scenario at 75 per cent rate using the GEM (2004) by 
following the next steps: 
By selecting the "Fiscal Module" from the main page of the GEM, clicking on 
Custom Regime tab, will give us the following page: 






wAnni Pi, qinu, 
I Fiscal Models 
I 
Merqe Calc Files 
Custom Fiscal Regimes in current Project: 






JCreate a new fiscal regime by selecting an existing regime and saving a copy of this under a different name. Once created you can 
I open the model on the fiscal models page and make the necessary changes to tax logic. For more information click here, 
Ploject ata - fvlay-ZO04 ,I ; I-I IIA- Wood Mackenzie Read-Only Di Mackenzie -SýS 
ýe 
Then clicking on Create a New Custom Fiscal Regime, and selecting United 
Kingdom to base the new regime on, typing anew regime name i. e. UK PRT 75 
per cent, check "Copy base regime data" and select create. This will move me to 
the following screen: 
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0 Delete selected regime(s) 




" "[ r, l 
" 1)1)11 LT1 
ý Delete selected regime(s) 
0 Create a New Custom Fiscal Regime 
a nevo fiscal regirric by selecting an existing regime and , aving a copy of this under a different name. once created you can Help 
:, pen the model on the fiscal modelspage andmakethe necessary changestotaytogic. For more information click here, 
LJ Ploject - Wood black-elizie kead-0111Y D'wl - rylay-2004 Close 
JiMackenzie 
ii 
Click on "fiscal Models" tab, select UK PRT 75 per cent, and click on "Edit 
Fiscal Model" will take me to a screen, on that screen go to "Tax Calculation 2" 
sheet, and then go to column AC and change the cell formula to 
=IF(A8<1975,0, IF(A8<1979,0.45, IF(A8=1979,0.6, IF(A8<1983,0.7, IF(A8<1993ý 
0.75, IF(AND(AS=1993, B8=1), 0.75,0.75))))))*FiscalSensFactor2, copy the 
formula down, and you will have the following screen. 
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Custom Fiscal Regimes In current Project: 
a= "I VIRINAV N1 11 Elle Edit View Insert Format Tools Data Window Help 
% +. 0 ; 00 Arial -8BIUUUM3 
. 00 .0W =1 - <5 -A r- z. - I 
lb t&Z f iklzý ". Igloo 0 . Z* A%. 
Q, 
Start GEM Shortcuts v ON,, Hide Calcs Close All Files Fiscal Terms Select Sheet: q> 
AC8 
----=-=IF(AB<1975.0, 
IF(AB<1979,0.45, IF(, 4B=1979,0.6, IF(AB<1983,0.7, IF(AB<1993,0.75, IF(AND(AB=1993, B8 
- ------ 
yv xYz -'-ýýA ýýB- A-c--T AD AF Ar Ae, 
4 SPD TRA PRT Loss cH PRT Oil Assessable PRT 






a 0.0 0.0 0.0 75 00% 0 00 0 
9 
- - 
0.0 0.0 0.0 , 75 00% . . 0 00 0 i 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 . 75 00% 
. - 0 00 0 T 0.0 0.0 0.0 . 75 00% 
. . 0 00 0 
12 0.0 0.0 0.0 . 75 00% 
. . 0 00 0 
13 00 0.0 0.0 . 75.00% . . 0 00 0 
14 
- - 
0.0 0.0 M 75.00% . . 0 00 0 ý5 0.0 0-0 U 75 00% . . 0 00 0 
16 
-T 
0.0 0.0 0.0 




. . 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0 0 
19 0.0 0.0 0.0 75,00% . 0.0 0 0 
19 0.0 0.0 0.0 75.00% . 0.0 0 0 
20 
iT 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
75.00% 
75,00% 
. 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 iT 
- - 




0.0 0.0 U 





Yfi 0.0 0.0 0.0 75.00% 0.0 0.0 
iT 
- - 
0.0 0.0 0.0 75.00% 0.0 0.0 
78 0.0 0.0 0.0 75.00% OD 0.0 
29 0.0 0.0 0.0 75.00% 0.0 0.0 
30 0.0 0.0 0.0 75.00% 0.0 0.0 
31 0.0 0.0 0.0 75.00% 0.0 0-0 
iT 0.0 0.0 0.0 75.00% 0.0 0.0 
33 0.0 0.0 0.0 75.00% 0.0 0.0 






0.0 00 0.0 U 75.00% 
4 ýl / Revenues ý, Field Costs F=conomic Parameteýs tax Calculations 
'Vax 
Calculations (2)ý_ Tax Calculations (3) / Tax 
ject: Wood Mackenzie Read-Only Data Sum=10500 
--i .,;. A, 
Select "close all files" button, then YES on save. 
This will create a new fiscal model on the GEM with a PRT rate 75 per cent 
beyond the 1993. Using this fiscal model for calculating the assets and companies 
will allow having results of these calculations based on a 75 per cent PRT. 
B- Calculating the differences in PRTpayments based on 75 per cent and 50 per 
cent rates. 
Data were obtained from the GEM (2004) by running company calculations at 
different PRT rates. Data presented in the Annual Summary Cash 
Flow table of 
the GEM (2004). 
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BP- PRT EM 
Year 50% 75% Difference 
1994 539.2 910.2 371.0 
1995 527.5 814.0 286.5 
1996 783.2 1132.5 349.3 
1997 643.5 949.5 306.0 
1998 368.0 567.1 199.1 
1999 260.0 399.8 139.8 
2000 639.2 974.0 334.8 
ITotals 3,760.45 1 5,746.95 1 1,986.51 
The 50 per cent per cent column shows BP's PRT payments over the period 1994- 
2000 at a 50 per cent rate. The 75 per cent shows the PRT payments at 75 per 
cent. The difference column represents the difference in PRT payments according 
to differences in PRT rates. The table shows the total difference in PRT payments 
that the BP saved because of reducing the PRT from 75 per cent to 50 per cent. 
The following table shows calculating the saving that would have occurred to BP 
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Annual Summary Cash Flow Table for Argyll Oil Field 
Eile Edit View Insert Format Tools Data Window Help 
7 
-7- 
0 Arial v 10 vBIU +0' 0 ;, 0 -- - --. - v5 
Aý Zý 100% ZA 
5tart GEM 5hortcuts Close All Files Print open Reports 
S18 I 
DEFGHJK AP 
1 Field Name: Aigyll Cteated On: 27-Jun-05 
2 
3 Calculation Mode-. Real Paid 
5 Year Production Gross Op Capital Royalty SPD/ PRT Corp, Total Field 
6 Liquids Gas Revenue Costs Costs APRT Tax Cash Flow 
7 000t/ im im im EM fm im im im 
9 1973 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 52,5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -52.5 
10 1974 0.0,0.0 0.0 0.0 124.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -124.0 
11 1975 500.01ý 0.0 123.0 40.6 74.6 8.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0,9 
12 1976 1125,0' 0.0 298.2 72.0,14.2 28.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 183.7 
13 1977 850.0 0.0 220A 69.2 25.0 19.6 0.0 0.0 30.6 76.0 
14 1978 700.0 0.0 145.6 57.3 21.1 11.4 0.0 0.0 49.1 6.7 
15 1979 850.0 0.0 212.7 51.5 41.7 20,5 0.0 0.0 25.6 73.5 
16 1980 800.0 0.0 267.5 45.6 39.2 28.0 0.0 0.0 42.4 112.3 
17 1981 500.0 0.0 179.4 60.2 13.4 16.2 0.0 0.0 68.7 20.9 
j ý8 1982 800.0 
'O'D 
270.2 54.6 34.7 28.2 0.0 1.6 41.2 110.1 
19 1983 750.0 0.0 2533 75.7 32.9 25.4 0.0 4.6 73.5 41.3 
29.2 20 1984 425.0 0,0 151.7 36.4 16.6 15,9 0.0 -1.6 55.2 
21 1985 525.0 0.0 172.8 37.2 0,0 18.5 0.0 0.0 35.8 81.3 
22 1986 500.0 0.0 75.4 32.1 0.0 6.7 0.0 0.0 46.0 -9.4 
213- 1987 450.0 0.0 70.9 27.0 0.0 6.7 0.0 0.0 12.7 24.5 
24 1988 350.0 0.0 39.1 23.0 0.0 2.9 0.0 0.0 12.3 0.9 
3.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 9.2 26 1989 300.0 0.0 41.9 25.6 9.0 
3.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 10.9 26 1990 235.0 0.0 35.5 17.4 0.0 
0.0 0.0 4,8 1.7 27 1991 200.0 0.0 24.5 16.3 0.0 
2181 1992 200.0 0.0 22.6 15.6 2.8 1.5 0.0 0.0 2.1 
0.6 
,2,9 1993 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 9.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.8 -10.6 
31 0' 1994 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 -3.1 
3.1 
31 1995 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0,13 
32 1996 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
14 liý "M \Annual Summary Cash Flow/ PV I Table'/ Annual Expanded Cash Flow Annual Pro-Tax Cash Flow 
Annual Govt Take Cash Flcj 41 
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